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Using data for publicly listed commercial banks and bank holding companies 
around the world, I investigate the market discipline effect of subordinated debt on 
banking firm risk taking in the period 2002-2008. In addition, I examine whether this 
effect depends on national bank regulations and legal and institutional conditions. I 
provide evidence that subordinated debt has a mitigating effect on banking firm risk 
taking. Further, the results suggest a threshold level of national bank regulations and 
economic development above which subordinated debt mitigates risk taking. Overall, the 
evidence supports the efficacy of proposals calling for increased use of subordinated debt 
in banking firms. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In this study, I examine whether subordinated debt mitigates bank risk taking and 
whether national bank regulations and economic development affect the relation between 
subordinated debt and bank risk taking. My study is motivated by policy considerations. 
It is evidenced from recent financial turmoil that excessive risk taking behavior of 
individual banks could expose the whole banking and financial system to systemic risk. 
Banking crises, in turn, have been shown by Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008), Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2008), Tong and Wei (2008) to have independent negative effects on the real 
economy. Hence, there is an increased call for more market discipline on banking firms. 
Subordinated debt has been widely proposed as a means to achieve this end. 
Proponents of increased use of subordinated debt by banking firms argue that it 
can impose both direct and indirect market discipline on these firms. Direct discipline is 
exerted through investors’ monitoring and increasing a bank’s expected cost of issuing 
subordinated debt in response to an increase in the bank’s perceived risk. Indirect market 
discipline is exerted when other agents, for example, banking supervisors, use the 
information from subordinated debt markets to increase the bank’s cost of operations. 
The anticipation of higher funding and operation costs in response to higher risk taking is 
expected to provide banks with greater incentives to refrain from taking excessive risk. 
This, in turn, is expected to lower banks’ vulnerability to insolvency and consequently to 
reduce the likelihood of systemic risk. 
 Most empirical studies in the field, such as Flannery and Sorescu (1996), 
DeYoung et al. (1998, 2001), Berger et al. (2000), Jagtiani et al. (2002), Sironi (2003), 
have focused on investigating two issues. First, whether subordinated debt holders 
understand banking firms’ true condition and incorporate these assessments promptly into 
the yields on their subordinated debt. And second, whether subordinated debt markets 
provide banking supervisors with relevant and helpful information for use in monitoring 
and disciplining bank risk taking. However, little is known about whether having 
subordinated debt in place mitigates bank risk taking. In addition, while theories, such as 
in  Decamps et al. (2004), Rochet (2004), Distinguin (2008), suggest that the disciplinary 
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effect of subordinated debt on bank risk taking depends crucially on national bank 
regulations and legal and institutional conditions, to my knowledge, no study has 
attempted to investigate this issue empirically. 
My study uses a sample of publicly listed commercial banks and bank holding 
companies around the world with data available over the period 2002-2008. With 
alternative measures of bank risk taking and empirical methods that address concerns 
about endogeneity and sample selection, I find evidence supporting the view that 
subordinated debt has a mitigating effect on bank risk taking. In particular, I show that 
this effect is not driven by sample selection bias, is robust to a variety of robustness 
checks, and is in place during the recent financial crisis. Moreover, the results suggest 
that the risk mitigating effect appears to be a distinctive feature of subordinated debt as a 
type of uninsured bank liabilities, possibly owing to its most junior status and a longer 
maturity than other uninsured bank debt. The evidence thus lends support to proposals 
calling for increased use of subordinated debt in banking firms. Also, the results are 
consistent with the prediction that there is some threshold level of national bank 
regulations and economic development above which subordinated debt exerts an effect 
on bank risk taking. In addition to regression analysis, I also conduct an event study 
where I use the nearest neighbor matching method to estimate the average effect on risk 
taking for banking firms that first have raw subordinated debt changed from zero to 
positive during the period 2003-2007. The results from this event study corroborate the 
study’s key findings. 
Examining risk taking by banks, my study is also closely related to the work of 
Laeven and Levine (2009) who study the effect of shareholders on bank risk taking. They 
provide evidence consistent with the view that large owners with substantial cash flow 
rights have greater incentives and power to increase bank risk taking than small 
shareholders,1 and that the relation between bank risk and national bank regulations 
depends on each bank’s ownership structure. I, on the other hand, show that subordinated 
debt holders can help mitigate bank risk taking, and that this effect depends on national 
bank regulations as well as legal and institutional conditions. 
                                                          
1
 The result is consistent with standard agency theory of the increased risk-shifting incentives of 
shareholders in highly levered firms (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Further, deposit insurance intensifies the 
ability and incentives of banks’ shareholders to increase risk (Keeley, 1990). 
3 
 
The rest of my dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter II discusses 
characteristics of subordinated debt and its relation with bank risk taking, and reviews the 
empirical and theoretical studies on this relation. Chapter III presents testable hypotheses. 
Chapter IV describes the methodology and data. Chapter V reports and analyzes 
empirical results on the risk mitigating effect of subordinated debt and various robustness 
checks. Chapter VI discusses policy implications, and Chapter VII concludes. 
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CHAPTER II 
CHARACTERISITICS OF SUBORDINATED DEBT AND ITS RELATION WITH 
BANKING FIRM RISK TAKING 
Since the 1980s, there have been several regulatory reform proposals to introduce 
a mandatory subordinated notes and debentures component as part of the bank capital 
requirement in the US.2 This is argued to be a means to increase market discipline on 
banking firms. Such proposals, however, as Evanoff and Wall (2007) point out, have not 
yet been implemented by US bank regulators as there are still concerns about using the 
signal extracted from debt yields to monitor or predict the viability of banking firms due 
to the lack of market depth, trading frequency, heterogeneous debt characteristics, and 
infrequency of issuance. Calomiris (1999) mentions that a market discipline approach 
failed to win sufficient political support, perhaps because the US Congress and many 
bank regulators were more comfortable with regulatory discretion than with market-
controlled outcomes. However, it should be noted that proposals for a mandatory 
subordinated debt policy generally view supervisory review and market discipline as 
complementary rather than substitutes.  
Efforts to enhance the role of market discipline are not specific to the US.  In fact, 
market discipline is one of the three pillars of the Basel II Capital Accord (together with 
minimum capital requirements and supervisory review), and allowing/requiring 
subordinated debt as a part of regulatory capital is viewed as an indicator of enhanced 
private oversight.3 The perceived need for more effective market discipline has 
intensified for at least two reasons. First, the increasing size and complexity of banking 
organizations, such as through consolidation of banks and nonbank activities and the use 
of financial innovations, have significantly complicated bank supervision and regulation. 
                                                          
2
 For a summary of different generations of proposals on subordinated debt holding, see Kwast et al. 
(1999), Evanoff and Wall (2000), Lang and Robertson (2002). 
 
3
 Allowing or requiring subordinated debt as a part of regulatory capital is a component of the Private 
Monitoring Index constructed by Barth et al. (2004) using the World Bank’s survey data on national bank 
regulations. The index is widely used in studies examining the impact of national bank regulations on bank 
performance, efficiency and valuation (e.g. Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2004, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and 
Levine, 2006, Barth, Lin, Lin, and Song, 2009). 
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While the evidence on the opaqueness of banks is mixed,4 the dominating view, at least 
among financial regulators, is that bank assets and activities are more opaque than those 
of a generic firm. The second reason, which is closely related to the first, is the desire of 
financial regulators to lower the potential vulnerability of the banking and financial 
system to systemic risk that could have severely adverse effects on the real economy.5 
To better understand why subordinated debt has been widely proposed by 
observers both within and outside the bank regulatory agencies as a means to enhance 
market discipline on banking firms, I first review the regulatory treatment of banking 
firms' subordinated debt and the characteristics that make it a potentially effective market 
discipline instrument, and then proceed with a summary of empirical and theoretical 
studies on the relation between subordinated debt and bank risk taking. 
2.1. Regulatory treatment of banking firms' subordinated debt 
 The 1988 Basel Capital Accord, as amended subsequently, has been widely 
adopted as the framework for capital adequacy regulation at the national level. Bank 
capital, as defined by the Basel Capital Accord, is intended to absorb losses without the 
interests of the senior debt holders, especially insured depositors, being affected. Under 
the Basel standards, eligible capital includes shareholders’ equity plus retained earnings 
and minority interests, general provisions and loss reserves, hybrid capital instruments, 
and subordinated debt. Among these instruments, shareholders' equity and disclosed 
reserves constitute Tier 1 (core) capital; Tier 2 capital consists of revaluation reserves and 
possibly undisclosed reserves, general provisions and loan loss reserves, hybrid capital 
instruments, and subordinated debt. In particular, subordinated debt, as its name suggests, 
is subordinated to senior debt (insured deposits, uninsured deposits, and other non-
subordinated debt) in default and includes conventional unsecured subordinated debt 
                                                          
4
 Morgan (2002) shows that major bond-rating agencies split substantially more over bank issues and 
insurance company issues than over other issues with similar features. On the contrary, using market 
microstructure properties and analysts’ earnings forecast, Flannery et al. (2004) find no evidence that banks 
are more opaque. The authors add one caveat that banking firms are highly regulated and government 
regulations and supervision may cause banking firms' transparency, i.e. reduce their intrinsic opaqueness. 
 
5
 Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008) show that banking crises have independent negative effects on growth, as banks 
must cut back their lending. The supply-side effects coupled with demand-side effects in the form of 
reduced consumer confidence have adverse effects on the real economy. The adverse effects could be 
severe regardless of whether the economy is market-based or bank-based (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008, Tong 
and Wei, 2008). 
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capital instruments with a minimum original fixed term to maturity of over five years.6 
For regulatory purposes, an amortization factor of 20% per year is applied over the last 
five years to maturity of the debt.7 Subordinated debt cannot exceed 50% of Tier 1 capital 
for inclusion in the capital base.8 
 Apart from helping banking firms satisfy regulatory requirements, given the limits 
of deposit insurance per depositor in most deposit insurance schemes, subordinated debt 
represents a viable alternative source of finance. And in this respect, the tax treatment of 
debt versus equity makes it preferred to equity.9 
2.2. Subordinated debt as a market discipline instrument 
While subordinated debt is not the only bank liability potentially capable of 
providing market discipline, it is argued that subordinated debt issues have characteristics 
that make them particularly attractive for providing increased market discipline.10  
First, for the price of a bank debt instrument to be risk-sensitive, investors must 
perceive that the government will not come to their rescue when the bank fails. Among 
bank liabilities, subordinated debt is uninsured. Further, it is the least senior of all debt 
obligations and thus the first, after equity, to lose value in the event of bank failure. Its 
yield, therefore, should be particularly sensitive to the risk of a banking firm. Also, the 
subordinated status of subordinated debt relative to other liabilities would provide its 
holders with a greater incentive to demand disclosure of the banking firm's risk. In turn, 
banking firms would have greater incentives to disclose relevant information on their 
risks so as to reduce the cost of subordinated debt. That cost would be lower, in part, 
                                                          
6
 The average maturity of subordinated debt issued in Basel Committee member countries over the period 
1990-2001 is 11.4 years (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2003). 
 
7
 There are some national differences with respect to the amortization of subordinated debt. For example, in 
Germany, subordinated debt counts as 40% over last 2 years; in the UK, 20% is amortized annually over 
last 4 years (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2003). 
 
8
 As Tier 1 capital must reach at least 4% of risk weighted assets under the Basel standards, mandatory 
subordinated debt proposals typically set the minimum required subordinated debt at 2-3% of risk weighted 
assets. 
 
9
 For funding purposes, other uninsured debt exhibits the same tax benefit. However, different types of 
banking firms' uninsured debt may co-exist owing to the heterogeneity of investors with preferences for 
different kinds of debt instruments and the depth of particular debt markets. 
 
10
 For a detailed discussion of subordinated debt characteristics, see Kwast et al. (1999). 
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because disclosure by banks would save research and analysis expenses for subordinated 
debt holders. Banks that take lower risks would benefit from effectively informing 
potential subordinated debt holders about their favorable situations. Banks with less-
favorable risk situations nevertheless would have to disclose information; otherwise, 
potential subordinated debt holders would have reason to draw adverse inferences. 
Furthermore, banks would have less incentive to withhold similar information at 
subsequent reporting intervals, since any interruption would likely be interpreted as an 
attempt to conceal a deteriorating situation (US Shadow Financial Regulatory 
Committee, 2000).  
Secondly, subordinated debt investors have incentive to monitor risk since they 
are exposed to losses, but they do not benefit from any upside gains that accrue to 
excessive risk-taking. Equity holders, while exposed to losses, can also reap gains from 
risk and thus have a much stronger preference for risk than subordinated debt investors 
have. Standard option pricing theory, such as in Gorton and Santomero (1990), Levonian 
(2001), suggests that, all else being equal, the value of equity increases with the risk of a 
banking firm’s assets - the value of shareholders' implicit call option on the bank's assets 
is increasing in the volatility of the bank's assets. In contrast, for solvent banks, as shown 
by Black and Cox (1975), Gorton and Santomero (1990), Levonian (2001), subordinated 
debt loses value if asset risk rises, all else equal. Thus, the incentive of subordinated debt 
investors to monitor and limit bank risk-taking is similar to that of bank supervisors and 
in contrast to that of equity holders.11 Further, holders of subordinated debt are more 
likely to be sophisticated investors,12 hence, are potentially capable of accurately 
assessing changes in a bank’s condition and taking actions accordingly.  
                                                          
11
 It is argued that subordinated debt is expected to provide market discipline only on banks that are clearly 
going concerns (Kwast el al., 1999). Intuitively, if a bank approaches insolvency, the only way 
subordinated debt holders could possibly be paid is for the bank to save itself by winning a large and risky 
bet; hence, in this case, the risk preferences of subordinated debt holders become more like those of 
shareholders. Theoretically, Black and Cox (1975), Gorton and Santomero (1990) show that, for banks that 
approach insolvency, the value of subordinated debt is an increasing function of asset risk, since 
subordinated debt is then effectively the residual claimant. This has implication for sample design and will 
be addressed later. Nevertheless, Ashcraft (2006) documents that an increase in the amount of subordinated 
debt in regulatory capital has an important positive effect in helping a bank recover from financial distress, 
possibly through restrictive covenants that prevent moral hazard during financial distress. 
 
12
 According to Kwast et al. (1999) and Hart and Zingales (2010a), holders of bank subordinated debt are 
mostly institutional investors. On the other hand, no information about subordinated debt investors is 
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Finally, subordinated debt has relatively long maturity that magnifies the risk 
sensitivity of subordinated debt investors; the longer maturity makes this instrument more 
responsive than short-term debt to bank actions that increase risk over the longer term. 
Also the fact that subordinated debt investors are not able to "run", i.e. withdraw their 
funds at short notice, provides the extra benefit of mitigating a systemic risk situation.  
Given these characteristics, proponents of increased use of subordinated debt as a 
market discipline instrument argue that subordinated debt can impose both direct and 
indirect market discipline on banks. Direct discipline would result from an expected 
increase in the cost of issuing subordinated debt in response to an increase in the bank’s 
perceived risk; to avoid this increased cost the bank would more prudently manage risk. 
The direct disciplinary effect of subordinated debt is better appreciated when viewed in 
the context of the existing deposit insurance system. The pricing of the current deposit 
insurance is insufficiently sensitive to the riskiness of various banks, and therefore, may 
encourage some banks to take additional risk. With subordinated debt being issued in 
place of insured deposits, the bank pays a price that is commensurate with its risk; hence, 
the "gain" from taking advantage of distortionary deposit insurance pricing is eliminated, 
at least for the portion of insured deposits that is replaced by subordinated debt. In brief, 
it is the sensitivity of subordinated debt pricing to banks' riskiness that is essential for 
direct discipline. In the context of subordinated debt rollovers, this price effect eliminates 
banks' ability to earn "risk-unadjusted abnormal returns". In other words, subordinated 
debt exercises direct discipline by raising the bank's cost of funds, thereby offsetting 
some or all of the gains that may flow to equity holders from increased risk exposure.13 
Indirect market discipline would result when other agents use the information 
from subordinated debt markets to increase the bank’s cost of operations. For example, 
bank supervisors could use debt yields as triggers for regulatory actions, such as 
conducting more frequent and intrusive on-site examinations, limiting a bank’s activities, 
or raising capital requirements. The increased regulatory interference is likely to impose 
                                                                                                                                                                             
available for Basel Committee member countries over the period 1990-2001 (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2003). The Bankscope database used in this study also does not provide information about 
subordinated debt holders. 
 
13
 Blum (2002), Distinguin (2008) show that, when subordinated debt replaces some of insured deposits, 
the sensitivity of subordinated debt pricing to bank riskiness leads a bank maximizing its expected surplus 
to choose a level of risk which is closer to the fi
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significant costs on bank managers' time and severely damage the bank's reputational 
capital; activity restrictions reduce the ability of banks to diversify income flows; and 
increased regulatory capital requirements are likely to result in increased funding costs 
since public policies, through taxes and government guarantees, ranging from deposit 
insurance to bailouts of uninsured creditors of too-big-to-fail banking firms, in effect 
penalize equity financing. In addition, private parties could increase the banking firm’s 
cost of funds, limit its supply of credit, or reduce its ability to engage in certain types of 
contracts, such as counterparty positions on derivative contracts, long-term commitments, 
or syndication agreements. Evanoff and Wall (2000) argue that the anticipation of these 
types of penalties, from either bank supervisors or private parties, provides banking firms 
with additional incentives to refrain from excessive risk taking.  
While private placements of subordinated debt to independent third parties could 
increase direct market discipline, for subordinated debt to increase both direct and 
indirect market discipline, it is virtually essential that the debt instrument be traded in a 
competitive market to independent third parties, so that bank supervisors and private 
parties could monitor its secondary market prices.14 
2.3. Empirical and theoretical studies on the relation between subordinated debt 
and bank risk taking 
Embedded in statements about the market discipline effect of subordinated debt 
are two distinct aspects of market discipline: market monitoring and market influence, 
which are first distinguished in  Bliss and Flannery (2000) and Flannery (2001). Market 
monitoring refers to the hypothesis that investors understand a financial firm’s true 
condition and incorporate these assessments promptly into the firm’s security prices. 
Market monitoring generates market signals that may convey useful information to 
supervisors. On the other hand, market influence is the process by which outside 
claimants influence a firm’s actions, either directly by investors or indirectly by 
supervisors.  
                                                          
14
 In Basel Committee member countries over the period 1990-2001, in terms of the number of 
subordinated debt issues, 53% are privately placed. However, as public placements tend to be significantly 
larger than private placements, in terms of the amounts issued, public placements account for 69%. The US 
has the largest market in public subordinated debt issuance in terms of value over 1990-2001 (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2003). The Bankscope database used in this study however does not 
allow distinguishing these two market types (see also footnote 43). 
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Most studies investigating the market discipline impact of subordinated debt have 
focused on testing the market monitoring effect, specifically, on the relation between 
bank risk characteristics and yields on subordinated debt. While prior studies done before 
1992, such as Avery et al. (1988), Gorton and Santomero (1990), do not find a significant 
relationship between bank risk characteristics and yield spreads on subordinated debt,15 
more recent studies find evidence that subordinated debt yield spreads do reflect an 
issuing bank’s financial condition. For example, Flannery and Sorescu (1996) find that 
firm-specific accounting risk measures are correlated with option-adjusted spread of 
subordinated debt over a Treasury bond with the same maturity in 1983-1991 and this 
correlation is mainly accounted for by the 1989-1991 period when conjectural 
government guarantees of subordinated debt weaken. DeYoung et al. (1998) and Jagtiani 
et al. (2002) find similar results for the 1989-1995 and 1992-1997 periods, respectively, 
when bank regulators have made it increasingly clear that subordinated debt holders are 
not protected should the bank fail. Similar evidence of subordinated debt's market 
monitoring effect is documented for subordinated debt issues in the European banking 
industry by Sironi (2003); in particular, the evidence is prominent after the formation of 
the European Monetary Union in late 1990s. More recently, Evanoff et al. (2007) show 
results indicating a superior, more informative risk-spread relationship surrounding the 
period of new debt issuance relative to other periods which they attribute to enhanced 
market transparency and liquidity surrounding new debt issues. In addition, Goyal (2005) 
provides evidence that subordinated debt holders can use restrictive covenants as an 
alternative channel to discipline bank risk taking.16 However, Krishnan et al. (2005) call 
into question the risk monitoring effect of subordinated debt. They argue that a relation 
between the levels of yield spreads and the levels of bank risk variables is a necessary but 
                                                          
15
 Possible reasons for lack of evidence in the early periods are: measurement errors in the yield spread 
measures, wrong specification of the relation between bank risk characteristics and yields on subordinated 
debt, and subordinated debt holders' perception of implicit government guarantees in the early periods. 
 
16
 The author uses a sample of subordinated debt contracts issued by US bank holding companies during 
the 1974-1995. These contracts specify restrictions on investment, financing, and payout policies. He notes 
that since the Basel Capital Accord in 1988, for the purpose of sharpening investors’ incentives to monitor 
their banks and ensuring the subordinate character of the debt, bank regulators have been standardizing 
debt contracts and restricting the ability of banks to include covenants in debt that qualifies as Tier 2 
capital. In light of the study’s findings that restrictive covenants in bank debt are important disciplining 
mechanisms, the author suggests that regulatory restrictions on including covenants in bank debt should be 
re-examined. 
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not sufficient condition for yield spreads to serve as an information signal on changing 
bank risk; for subordinated debt to enhance risk monitoring, changes in bank risk should 
be reflected in spread changes. They do not find strong and consistent evidence of this 
relation.  
Another strand of literature looks for evidence on the potential for indirect 
disciplinary effect of subordinated debt by comparing information available to regulators 
with that available to the private markets. Though bank supervisors have access to 
extensive inside information through the on-site examination process, studies’ results, 
such as in Berger et al. (2000), DeYoung et al. (2001), Evanoff and Wall (2002), 
Krishnan et al. (2006), suggest that both financial markets participants and bank 
supervisors produce value-relevant information about the future soundness of banks, that 
private markets participants’ assessments and supervisory assessments complement one 
another, and that market information could be utilized to improve the predictive accuracy 
of traditional monitoring models used by regulators to predict the future condition of 
banks. One implication of this line of research is that the primary value of subordinated 
debt may lie not in its ability to control bank risk taking directly, but rather in its ability 
to generate helpful market signals about bank condition to which supervisors could 
respond with timely and effective regulatory discipline. 
On the other hand, few studies have directly investigated the market influence 
role of subordinated debt, i.e. whether or not the expected increase in the costs of funding 
and operations in response to an increase in the bank’s perceived risk actually causes 
banks with subordinated debt to be less likely to adopt excessively risky strategies in the 
first place and/or to manage their risk more prudently. To my knowledge, there are two 
studies with mixed evidence. Ashcraft (2006) shows that, for a sample of US banks and 
bank holding companies, an increase in the ratio of subordinated debt to regulatory 
capital has a positive effect on the future outcomes of distressed banks. While this is the 
first article to provide evidence on the preventative influence role of subordinated debt, it 
does not adequately address a number of econometric issues, such as correcting the 
variance-covariance matrix of parameter estimates in the second stage of a non-
traditional two-stage estimation and testing the validity of the suggested instrument (the 
state corporate income tax rate). Krishnan et al. (2005) focus mainly on testing the market 
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monitoring effect of subordinated debt rather than on testing the preventative influence 
effect. For the latter test, using a sample of 28 US banks and bank holding companies, 
they examine changes in bank risk characteristics around the time a banking firm first 
issues subordinated debt (both raw risk changes and adjusted risk changes measured 
relative to size, leverage, and profitability matched non-subordinated-debt-issuing 
banking firms). They find no evidence of a significant change in bank-specific risk 
characteristics. The matching analysis, however, does not adequately control for factors 
that are expected to affect both the outcome and the propensity of banking firms to issue 
subordinated debt. Also, the small sample size does not allow meaningful generalization 
of the result. 
While numerous proposals to introduce a mandatory subordinated debt policy 
have been drafted and critically discussed over the course of almost three decades, the 
theoretical research on the role of subordinated debt in enhancing market discipline 
provides different implications, depending on the time structure of the models and the 
assumptions used. Levonian (2001) models subordinated debt issued by a bank as a 
contingent claim on the bank’s assets. Within the context of the model, subordinated debt 
has few advantages over equity, either as a form of capital or as a source of market 
discipline. The model also illustrates that subordinated debt prices contain no information 
about the condition of issuers beyond what could be derived from their equity prices. 
However, the author also notes that if the noise in subordinated debt pricing is not 
perfectly correlated with the noise in equity pricing, the use of the two should lead to 
better estimates of asset value and asset volatility.17 Blum (2002), using a static model, 
shows that subordinated debt reduces risk only if banks can credibly commit to a given 
level of risk. However, if banks cannot commit, subordinated debt leads to an increase in 
risk. Due to limited liability, banks always have an incentive to increase their risk after 
the interest rate is contracted in order to reduce the expected costs of debt. Rational debt 
holders anticipate this behavior and accordingly require a higher risk premium ex ante. 
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 It should also be noted that empirical studies on the potential of subordinated debt to exert indirect 
disciplinary effect show that supervisory assessments and bond market indicators are strongly interrelated, 
while supervisory assessments and equity market indicators are not. This difference could be attributed to 
divergent incentives. Hence, subordinated debt markets are potentially capable of providing relevant, useful 
information to supervisors. 
 
13 
 
The higher interest rates in turn further aggravate the excessive risk-taking incentives of 
banks. However, it should be noted that the implication of the model could be attributed 
to its time structure; in a dynamic setting, low-risk equilibria become feasible. Moreover, 
the model does not explicitly consider the role of banking regulators and the potential 
indirect market discipline effect of subordinated debt. 
In fact, when examining the interaction and the optimal mix of the three pillars of 
the Basel Capital Accord (capital adequacy requirement, supervisory review and market 
discipline) in a continuous time setting, Decamps et al. (2004) and Rochet (2004) show 
that subordinated debt can constrain risk taking. In particular, direct market discipline is 
effective when the credibility of supervisors to close insufficiently-capitalized banks is 
established and subordinated debt holders are exposed to full losses.18 With regard to 
indirect market discipline, the intensity of regulation can be modulated according to 
market information, and symmetrically, supervisors can be forced to intervene when 
market signals reveal the distress of a bank. Thus, market discipline and supervisory 
actions are complementary rather than substitutes. Niu (2008)’s dynamic discrete-time 
model also supports proposals calling for increased use of subordinated debt. The author 
proposes an answer to the question raised by Blum (2002): how can a bank credibly 
commit to choosing a given level of risk after debt issuance? He shows that, under the 
assumption that creditors can imperfectly observe which type of assets the bank has 
chosen before debt issuance, the bank can use its existing safe assets as a commitment 
and bonding device. The implication is that banks reduce their risk before they issue 
subordinated debt. Distinguin (2008) sets up a model where a bank chooses a level of 
monitoring that maximizes its expected value, and the bank’s risk is subject to banking 
supervision. She shows that requiring banks to issue subordinated debt reduces bank risk 
and allows a better allocation of supervisory resources if subordinated debt holders have 
access to sufficient information about banks’ condition, and they do not benefit from any 
kind of insurance, either explicit or implicit. 
It should be noted that to keep the models tractable, these theoretical studies do 
not address the agency problem between managers and shareholders, but assume that 
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 Subordinated debt's direct market discipline is compatible with public liquidity assistance, if such 
assistance is deemed socially desirable, provided that subordinated debt holders lose their stake if the bank 
is rescued. 
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bank managers act in the best interest of shareholders. In practice, bank managers' and 
shareholders' interests could be aligned though appropriately designed compensation 
schemes. On the other hand, as shown in Jensen and Meckling (1976), Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985), bank-specific human capital skills and private benefits of control may cause bank 
managers to opt for less risk taking than shareholders without those skills and benefits.19 
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 In the empirical analysis, when possible, I control for managerial compensation/ownership together with 
other corporate governance attributes (See subsections 4.1.3 and 5.1.8). 
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CHAPTER III 
HYPOTHESES 
While subordinated debt has characteristics that make it potentially capable of 
mitigating bank risk taking, it is expected to be an effective market discipline instrument 
only when certain conditions are satisfied. The following four testable hypotheses are 
formed based on the implications of theoretical studies discussed earlier. 
For subordinated debt to work as a market discipline instrument, a necessary 
condition is that subordinated debt holders have access to sufficient information to assess 
a bank’s true condition (Decamps et al., 2004, Rochet, 2004, Distinguin, 2008). 
Therefore, the effect of subordinated debt on bank risk taking is expected to depend on 
national bank regulations that foster private oversight.  
In addition, for subordinated debt to impose indirect discipline on bank risk 
taking, i.e. through providing regulators with information for use in their supervision, a 
necessary condition is that the supervisory authorities have the authority to take specific 
actions to prevent and correct problems in banks upon receiving the relevant information 
from subordinated debt markets.20 Therefore, the indirect disciplinary effect of 
subordinated debt on bank risk taking is expected to depend on national bank regulations 
that duly empower supervisory authorities.  
The effectiveness of subordinated debt in imposing market discipline could be 
undermined if, for example, it is not held at arm’s length or credit enhancement is used to 
support the debt (Calomiris, 1999, Evanoff and Wall 2000), i.e. the lender is provided 
with reassurance that the borrower will honor the obligation through additional collateral, 
insurance, or a third party guarantee, hence, credit enhancement reduces credit/default 
risk of the debt. Better economic and financial development is likely to go hand in hand 
with a strong legal system (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998), which could have built-in 
mechanisms and regulations to thwart insider arrangements. In addition, better economic 
and financial development is likely to be directly associated with more sophisticated 
investors, which in turn is a necessary condition for subordinated debt to effectively 
impose market discipline on banks. Therefore, the market discipline effect of 
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 This is consistent with Decamps et al. (2004) and Rochet (2004) model implications. 
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subordinated debt on bank risk taking is expected to depend on or be associated with a 
country's level of economic development. 
Theories suggest that subordinated debt can work as a market discipline 
instrument in the absence of regulatory forbearance and government implicit guarantees 
(Decamps et al., 2004, Rochet, 2004, Distinguin, 2008). It is well documented in the 
banking literature that banking authorities are often subject to political pressure for 
bailing out creditors of distressed banks that are perceived to be too big to fail. Therefore, 
the market discipline effect of subordinated debt is expected to be nonexistent or, at most, 
weaker in too-big-to-fail banks and banks in which the government has a considerable 
stake, hence, an incentive to bail them out. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1. Variable descriptions 
 In this subsection I discuss the main variables of interest. Definitions of all 
variables used in the empirical analysis can be found in Table I.21 
4.1.1. Measuring subordinated debt  
 A reasonable test of the market influence effect of subordinated debt would be to 
compare how banks that start with the same levels of risk-weighted assets22 (thus have 
similar initial assets risk) but have different amounts of subordinated debt on their 
balance sheets to support the risk-weighted assets differ in terms of future risk taking. 
Thus, a relevant measure of subordinated debt should be the ratio of subordinated debt to 
risk-weighted assets. The level of a bank’s risk-weighted assets is not directly available 
from the bank’s balance sheet but could be computed if either both Total Capital and 
Total Capital Ratio or both Tier 1 Capital and Tier 1 Capital Ratio are available since the 
denominator used in computing these capital ratios is the bank’s total risk-weighted 
assets (Total Capital Ratio equals Total Capital divided by total risk-weighted assets, and 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio equals Tier 1 Capital divided by total risk-weighted assets). 
Unfortunately, these capital ratios cannot be calculated simply by looking at the balance 
sheet of a bank but have to be calculated internally by the bank. Banks may publish these 
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 All main tables are included in Appendix A. 
 
22
 Market risk, operational risk, and credit risk are accounted for in calculating the total risk-weighted assets 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2001). Risk-weighted assets are the denominator used in 
determining the minimum regulatory capital requirements (Tier 1 Capital Ratio and Total Capital Ratio). 
94.1%, 98.7%, and 98.6% of countries that participated in the World Bank’s Surveys I, II, and III, 
respectively, on national bank regulations answered “Yes” to the question whether the minimum capital-
asset ratio is risk-weighted in line with the Basel guidelines. Risk-weighted assets are also the most 
frequently used denominator in determining the minimum subordinated debt ratio in proposals for a 
mandatory subordinated debt policy. While one can always argue that the risk weighting scheme used in 
constructing the risk-weighted assets is debatable, and that the risk-weighted assets are not perfectly 
comparable across banks, in the absence of a better measure, a bank’s amount of risk-weighted assets is 
expected to be more informative about the initial riskiness of the bank’s assets than other measures such as 
the amount of total assets or the amount of total liabilities. 
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numbers in their annual reports or may not.23 Therefore, using the ratio of subordinated 
debt to risk-weighted assets as the main measure of subordinated debt results in a smaller 
sample size. 
An alternative measure of subordinated debt is the ratio of subordinated debt to 
total liabilities. The advantage of using this measure is that a bank’s total liabilities are 
readily available from its balance sheet, hence, the resulting sample is larger. The 
disadvantage is that the implication of a test using this measure of subordinated debt is 
less clear since the level of total liabilities per se is less informative about the riskiness of 
the bank’s assets.  
I use the ratio of subordinated debt to risk-weighted assets as the main measure of 
subordinated debt in the analysis and the ratio of subordinated debt to total liabilities as a 
robustness check.  
4.1.2. Measuring bank risk taking  
An increasingly used measure of bank risk taking is the z-score of each bank – the 
distance from insolvency.24 Specifically,  
    	
  
with  denoting assets,  equity, and  profits,     is the return on average total 
assets,     is the equity capital-assets ratio, and 	) is the standard deviation 
of the return on average total assets.25 Let 	
 denote a bank’s return distribution. 
Insolvency risk is defined as the probability that losses exceed equity: 
	   
  	  
   	


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 Potential issues with banks' choice of reporting these numbers are discussed in a later subsection. 
 
24
 See, for example, Laeven and Levine (2009), Maechler et al. (2007), Lin et al.(2005), De Nicolo (2000), 
Altman and Saunders (1998). Since the z-score is highly skewed, I use the natural logarithm of the z-score 
in the analysis. 
 
25
 The standard deviation of the return on average total assets is computed over a moving window of 4 
years. With respect to the return on average total assets, using the four-year moving average return on 
average total assets or one-year return on average total assets in computing the z-score produces 
qualitatively similar results. Since the aim is to construct a measure of future risk taking, I use the one-year 
return on average total assets to compute the z-score used in the main analysis. 
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Roy (1952) and De Nicolo (2000) show that: 
	  
  1           	1
 
At the upper bound of insolvency risk:     
	  
    1       	1
 
Then: 
                !   12  !             	2
 
  ! #  12 	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            ! # 12 	1  
          	3
 
 Approximation (3) defines a strictly linear relationship between the natural 
logarithm of z-score, the measure of risk taking used in my study, and the probability of 
insolvency. This approximation works well for values of  that are closer to 1 than to 0 - 
a condition that does not hold in the data. Nevertheless, equation (2) implies a strictly 
monotonic relationship between the natural logarithm of z-score and the probability of 
insolvency. A higher  ! is associated with a lower  and vice versa. More generally, (1) 
and (2) show that minimizing 	  
 is equivalent to maximizing  !. 
Therefore, it is plausible to use  ! as a measure of insolvency risk.26 
 Under the assumption of normality of banks’ returns: 
	  
   %	0,1

(

 
The relationship between 	  
 and  is strictly monotonic. In this case,  
measures the number of standard deviations a return realization has to fall in order to 
deplete equity.27 Thus, a higher z-score indicates that the bank is more stable.  
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 As a matter of fact, (1′) shows that the nonlinear relationship between  and  poses a problem only if 
both negative and positive values of  are included in the analysis, as  is positively correlated with  for 
negative values of , but negatively correlated with  for positive values of . Recall that subordinated debt 
is expected to provide market discipline only on banks that are clearly going concerns (Kwast el al., 1999), 
hence, banks with negative values of z-score (i.e. are clearly in distress), are by design not supposed to be 
included in the analysis. 
 
27
 I assess if the assumption of normality of banks' return holds in the data in Chapter V. 
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Alternative measures of bank risk used in the analysis are earnings volatility and 
standard deviation of return on average total assets. Earnings volatility equals the 
standard deviation of the ratio of total earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions to 
average total assets, computed over a moving window of 4 years. The same moving 
window is used in computing the standard deviation of return on average total assets. 
4.1.3. Bank-level control variables 
Laeven and Levine (2009) show that banks that have large owners with 
substantial cash flow rights tend to take more risk. To proxy for ownership, I use the 
Bureau Van Dijk Independence Indicator variable, which takes value one if there is no 
shareholder having more than 25% of direct or total ownership. Data permitting, I use the 
last ownership data available up to December 2006.28 For example, if a bank’s last year 
of data in the Bankscope database is 2004, then the 2004 ownership data is used. For 
banks that remain in the database after December 2006, I use the ownership data recorded 
in December 2006 or December 2005, if available.29 A bank is dropped from the final 
sample if its ownership data is not available before or in December 2006. There are 
potential problems with this approach; the most obvious is that I am using this data to 
proxy for bank ownership for the period 2002-2007. However, there is also some 
justification for doing this. Laeven and Levine (2009) use thresholds of 10% and 20% to 
define a large owner30  and report that bank ownership changes extremely little over time. 
Thus, a higher cut-off used to define the Bureau Van Dijk Independence Indicator makes 
it less likely that a bank switches from one category of ownership to the other during 
normal time. To check if the result is sensitive to the ownership data, I estimate a 
specification where explanatory variables are measured in (up to) 2006, and bank risk 
taking is measured over 2007-2008, i.e. after bank ownership is observed. 
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 Bankscope reports the most recent ownership data. 
 
29
 Historical ownership data for December 2006 and December 2005 was provided by Bureau Van Dijk. 
 
30
 Laeven and Levine (2009) also use the 2001 ownership database to study bank risk taking averaged over 
1996-2001. For an example with studies using panel data, Weisbach (1988) uses 1980 data to measure 
board control for 1974 to 1983; the assumption is that there is little change in board shareholdings. 
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Goyal (2005) argues that risk taking incentives of banks depend on the value of 
their charter, which reflects future economic rents that banks obtain from privileged 
access to markets protected from competition. I follow Goyal (2005) in using the ratio of 
demand deposits to total deposits as a proxy for bank charter value.31 Other commonly 
used bank-level control variables are size, computed as the natural logarithm of total 
assets in thousands of US dollars, loan growth, liquidity ratio and loan loss provisions 
ratio.  
In extended versions of the main regression specification, I also control for other 
uninsured debt and bank-level corporate governance. Specifically, short-term uninsured 
debt is measured as deposits and short-term funding less total deposits. Other long-term 
uninsured debt is measured as total other funding less subordinated debt. Other uninsured 
debt is then the sum of the short-term and the other long-term uninsured debt. All of these 
measures are normalized alternatively by the bank’s total risk-weighted assets or total 
liabilities. 
Bank-level corporate governance data provided by the Institutional Shareholder 
Services (ISS) is available for US firms only. Since the methodology that the ISS uses to 
construct the Corporate Governance Quotient (CGQ) for US firms has changed over time 
(in terms of the number of included governance attributes as well as the governance 
standards associated with governance attributes), I construct governance indexes using 
those attributes that are consistent over time (52 attributes in four broad categories: board 
of directors, audit, anti-takeover, and managerial compensation/ownership). The first 
constructed index is expressed as a percentage, where satisfying all 52 attributes earns a 
firm an index of 100%; if an attribute is missing then the index represents the percentage 
of non-missing attributes that are satisfied. The second constructed index is additive. In 
addition, I also use the ISS’ Industry CGQ as a robustness check. 
4.1.4. Country-level control variables 
 To control for country heterogeneity I use country dummies and the natural 
logarithm of GDP per capita, which is highly correlated with a country’s level of 
                                                          
31
 Arguments for using demand deposits ratio as a proxy for bank charter value can be found in Keeley 
(1990), Neumark and Sharpe (1992), Hutchison and Pennacchi (1996). 
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financial development and rule of law index.32 There is always a chance that some time-
variant country characteristic is unobserved or cannot be measured, and hence not 
controlled for. However, if there is little variation over time in these country 
characteristics, as it is generally assumed to be the case for measures of institutional 
conditions such as accounting standards and costs of smoothing earnings, their effects are 
likely to be largely captured by the country fixed effects.  
With respect to national bank regulations, I use three regulation measures that are 
closely related to the three pillars of the Basel Capital Accord. These are the capital 
regulation index, the supervisory power index and the private monitoring index. These 
indexes are computed using the World Bank’s survey data on national bank regulations33 
and the methodology in Barth et al. (2004).  
The capital regulation index is an index of regulatory oversight of bank capital, 
accounting for both initial and overall capital stringency. It includes information on 
whether certain funds may be used to initially capitalize a bank, whether these funds are 
officially verified, and whether there are explicit regulatory requirements regarding the 
amount of capital that a bank must have relative to various guidelines. The official 
supervisory index measures the extent to which official supervisory authorities have the 
authority to take specific disciplinary actions to prevent and correct problems. The 
private monitoring index captures the extent to which bank regulations force banks to 
disclose accurate information to the public and induce private sector monitoring of banks. 
To focus on the effect of regulations on information disclosure and deposit insurance, I 
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 Financial development is measured as the sum of stock market capitalization to GDP and total credit to 
the private sector as a share of GDP (Levine and Zervos, 1998, Levine, 2004). The Rule of Law Index is 
constructed by Kaufmann et al. (2008) and reflects the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide 
by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and 
the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. The pairwise correlations of GDP per capita, 
financial development and rule of law index are in the 0.80 range. 
 
33
 The first survey data was collected in late 1990s and early 2000s. The second survey describes the 
regulatory environment at the end of 2002. The third survey describes the situation in 2006 (Barth et al., 
2008). For years in which no survey was conducted, I assume that banking regulations remain unchanged 
in the years following the most recent survey. Specifically, Survey I data is used for year 2002, Survey II 
data for years 2003, 2004, 2005, and Survey III data for years 2006 and 2007. Many other studies that have 
used this database across a number of years follow a similar approach (e.g. Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2004, 
Beck et al., 2006). 
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also construct a sub-index of the private monitoring index, which is the disclosure-
insurance index.34 Detailed description of these indexes is provided in Table I.  
One limitation of these national bank regulation measures is that they contain 
little variation over time and thus are expected to be largely indistinguishable from 
country specific effects that may reflect other features than the banking regulatory 
environment. I discuss a way to address this issue in the next subsection. 
4.2. Methodology 
4.2.1. Main regression specification  
To assess the impact of subordinated debt on bank risk taking during the period 
2002-2008, I estimate the following model, which is built on the base specification in 
Laeven and Levine (2009), who study the effect of shareholders on bank risk taking: 
 
Bank-level risk taking = a + b1(Bank-level SND ratio) + b2(Bank-level Control 
 Variables) + b3(Country-level Control Variables) + b4(Year dummies) + e        (A) 
 
Bank-level risk taking is measured by the z-score, the standard deviation of return 
and the earnings volatility. Bank-level SND ratio is the ratio of subordinated debt to total 
risk-weighted assets or total liabilities. Bank-level control variables are the Bureau Van 
Dijk independence indicator, the demand deposits ratio, bank size, loan growth, liquidity 
ratio and loan loss provisions ratio. Country-level control variables include the natural 
logarithm of GDP per capita, the capital regulation index, the supervisory power index, 
the private monitoring index (disclosure-insurance index), and country dummies. All 
explanatory variables, except for country dummies and year dummies, are lagged by one 
year. Standard errors are clustered by country.35 
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 The private monitoring index and disclosure-insurance index are informative about whether there is an 
explicit deposit insurance scheme and, if not, whether depositors were fully compensated the last time a 
bank failed. Subordinated debt is explicitly uninsured. The above-mentioned indexes do not reflect whether 
or not subordinated debt holders may benefit from implicit government guarantees. Moreover, this question 
is likely to be relevant at the bank level rather than at the country level. I investigate the market discipline 
effect of subordinated debt on the risk taking of too-big-to-fail banks in Chapter V. 
 
35
 Two-way clustering by country and year is not feasible because the number of years is too small (For a 
discussion on this, see Cameron et al., 2006, Thompson, 2009, and Petersen, 2009). Therefore, I follow 
recommendation in Petersen (2009) to use year dummies and estimate standard errors clustered on country. 
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There is no reason for the market discipline effect of subordinated debt to be 
linear in the national bank regulations or the country’s level of economic development. It 
could well be the case that there is some threshold level of national bank regulations and 
economic development above which subordinated debt could exert the desirable effect. 
To investigate this possibility, I split the sample between High and Low on each of the 
relevant national bank regulations and the country’s level of economic development to 
test each of the four hypotheses proposed earlier. This procedure is also one way to 
examine the impact of national bank regulations on the market discipline effect of 
subordinated debt that does not have to rely heavily on the limited time series variation of 
national bank regulation measures discussed earlier. 
4.2.2. Econometric issues 
A number of econometric issues in the regression analysis need to be addressed. 
One issue is the potential endogeneity of the regressors. In particular, for most countries 
participating in the World Bank surveys, subordinated debt is allowable, but not required, 
as a source of capital; hence banks choose to have subordinated debt and how much to 
have. If, for example, only banks with a reputation of being efficient, safe and sound 
banks choose to issue subordinated debt, then the subordinated debt variable is not 
exogenous. This, in turn, leads to inconsistent coefficient estimates and unclear 
inferences about the direction of causality. I address the issue of endogeneity of 
regressors in a number of ways. First, in specification A, explanatory variables are lagged 
by one year. Second, to deal with the endogeneity of the subordinated debt measure, I 
conduct all regression analyses using the instrumental variable approach to isolate 
plausibly exogenous variation in the subordinated debt measure.  
Inspired by Caprio et al. (2007) and Laeven and Levine (2009), I use the average 
subordinated debt ratio of other banks in the same country, year and size group as one 
instrument for a bank’s subordinated debt ratio.36 This measure is meant to capture 
                                                          
36
 Specifically, for each measure of subordinated debt, if the number of banks with non-missing value of 
subordinated debt ratio in a given country and year is greater than 5, the banks are categorized into two size 
groups depending on whether bank size is below or at/above the median size. If the number of banks with 
non-missing value of subordinated debt ratio in a given country and year is less than or equal to 5, the 
average subordinated debt ratio of other banks in the same country and year is computed and used as an 
instrument for a bank’s subordinated debt ratio. This is to reduce the possibility that only one bank ends up 
in a size category, which eventually amounts to losing that observation. 
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country, industry, and peer-group factors explaining subordinated debt ratio. Note that it 
is necessary that this instrument be constructed using a bank-level characteristic (size, in 
this case) for it to have explanatory power. Otherwise, its effect would be largely 
absorbed by the country fixed effects. Size is chosen as the relevant bank-level 
characteristic because it is observed that, at least for countries with a relatively large 
number of banks in the sample, there appears to be a positive correlation between bank 
size and the presence of subordinated debt on the bank’s balance sheet.  
In addition, as discussed in Kwast et al. (1999), banking firms with larger equity-
to-assets ratios may be perceived to be less likely to fail for a given level of risk than 
those with smaller equity-to-assets ratios, hence, they may have a lower expected 
subordinated debt spread and be more willing to issue subordinated debt. On the other 
hand, banking firms with smaller equity-to-assets ratios may have a greater desire to issue 
subordinated debt because of the need to raise Tier 2 capital. Therefore, I use the bank’s 
lagged equity-to-assets ratio as the second instrument for its subordinated debt ratio. 
Kwast et al. (1999) also discuss the tax benefit of subordinated debt. Presumably, the 
higher the bank’s tax rate, the greater the benefit from being able to deduct the interest 
payments paid to subordinated debt holders. I use the bank’s average tax rate, computed 
as tax expense divided by profit before tax, as the third instrument for its subordinated 
debt ratio. While the suggested instruments are expected to be correlated with a bank’s 
subordinated debt ratio, they are unlikely to have a direct effect on the bank’s future risk 
taking; therefore these instruments are expected to reduce endogeneity bias. Their 
validity will be tested empirically. 
Another potential issue is related to banking firms’ choice to report the Total 
Capital Ratio and Total Capital and/or Tier 1 Capital Ratio and Tier 1 Capital. If the 
banks that report these numbers tend to behave differently with respect to future risk 
taking then the analysis using the ratio of subordinated debt to risk-weighted assets, i.e. 
using the sample of banks that report the capital ratios, could suffer from sample 
selection bias. I address this issue in two ways. First, I estimate equation A using the ratio 
of subordinated debt to total liabilities instead. Second, I investigate whether the choice 
of reporting the capital ratios is systematically correlated with future risk taking by 
estimating the following system of equations (a treatment-effects version of the bivariate 
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normal selection model) for all banks with non-missing values of z-score and explanatory 
variables for the period 2002-2008.  
 
Report = c + d1(Accounting standard) + d2(Bank characteristics)  + 
                              + d3(Country-level Control Variables) + d4(Year dummies) + u       
Bank-level risk taking = a + b1(Report) + b2 (Bank characteristics)  +  
                              + b3(Country-level Control Variables) + b4(Year dummies) + e       (B) 
 
Report is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if a bank reports either the Total 
Capital Ratio and Total Capital or Tier 1 Capital Ratio and Tier 1 Capital, and zero 
otherwise. Accounting Standard is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the bank 
reports according to IAS, IFRS, Regulatory standard, or local GAAP (for US banks 
only), and zero otherwise. The Accounting Standard is the excluded exogenous variable 
since it is likely that a bank’s reporting practice is governed, at least partly, by accounting 
standards and common disclosure practice. Note that the ratio of subordinated debt to 
risk-weighted assets cannot be on the right hand side of the second equation because it is 
missing when Report takes value zero; however, the future outcome is observed for both 
banks that report and banks that do not report the capital ratios. The bank characteristic 
variables are bank ownership, loan growth, size, demand deposits ratio, liquidity ratio, 
loan loss provisions ratio, and leverage.37 
The first equation estimates the propensity to report the capital ratios, and the 
second equation predicts the bank’s future risk taking as a function of its choice of 
reporting these capital ratios. The inverse Mills ratio vector obtained from estimating the 
first equation is used as a regressor in estimating the second equation so that the 
coefficient on Report in the second equation is purged of any problem due to potentially 
endogenous selection of banks into the “treatment” – reporting the capital ratios. The 
two-step estimates are then used as starting values for full information maximum 
likelihood estimation. The estimates of b1 and rho (the correlation of u and e) can then be 
used to judge whether sample selection bias exists in the data. If reporting the capital 
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 Leverage can be included because sub-debt ratio is not in the equations. One of the instruments for sub-
debt ratio – the lagged equity-to-assets ratio is highly correlated with leverage; the pairwise correlation is - 
0.93. 
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ratios or not is not systematically correlated with future risk taking, then using a sample 
of banks that report should not pose a problem. 
4.2.3. Event study  
Niu (2008) suggests that banks can use their existing safe assets as a commitment 
and bonding device, hence banks may reduce their risk before issuing subordinated debt. 
To examine this possibility, I use the matching estimator to estimate the average 
treatment effect on bank risk taking one year before and one year after the treatment, 
where the treatment is defined as bank first having raw subordinated debt changed from 
zero to positive during the period 2003-2007. The test could have power if the first time a 
bank issues subordinated debt signifies a higher level of monitoring that it is exposed to; 
on the other hand, the test may have low power if some unknown threshold level of 
subordinated debt is required before it could have the desirable effect on bank risk taking.  
Let )*,+ be an indicator of whether bank , has raw subordinated debt changed 
from zero to positive for the first time at time -. Let .*,+/01  denote the risk measure of 
bank , at time -  2. Also let .*,+/03  denote the risk measure if the bank had not issued 
subordinated debt. The average effect of first issuing subordinated debt on bank risk 
taking for the treated banks is: 
	.*,+/01  .*,+/03 4)*,+  15  6.*,+/01 4)*,+  15  	.*,+/03 |)*,+  1
 
where 	.*,+/03 |)*,+  1
 is unobserved. For each treated bank ,, the matching estimator 
imputes the missing potential outcome by using the average outcome for untreated 
(control) banks with similar observable characteristics. In the analysis that follows I 
adopt the method of nearest neighbor matching with replacement, proposed by Abadie 
and Imbens (2002) and Abadie et al. (2004). In particular, I use the bias-corrected 
matching estimator that adjusts the difference within the matches for the differences in 
the values of their observables. Let % be the number of treated banks, and let 89	,
 
:;1	,
, … , ;9	,
= denote the set of indices for the first M matches for bank ,. Let >?	@
 
A.?|@B where X is a vector of observables, and let >̂?	@*
 be a consistent estimator of 
>?	@*
. The bias-corrected matching estimator for the average treatment effect on bank 
risk taking for treated banks is: 
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 Treated banks are banking firms that first have raw subordinated debt changed 
from zero to positive during the period 2003-2007. The control group for a particular year 
includes banking firms that have not had subordinated debt on their balance sheets up to 
that year.38 To estimate the average treatment effect on bank risk taking for treated banks 
one year after the treatment, i.e. in year t+1, treated and control banks are matched based 
on their observable characteristics in year t-1. Similarly, to estimate the average treatment 
effect on bank risk taking for treated banks one year before the treatment, i.e. in year t-1, 
treated and control banks are matched based on their observable characteristics in year t-
2. The observable characteristics include factors expected to affect both outcome and 
treatment. The bank-level control variables discussed earlier, namely, bank size, demand 
deposits ratio, loan growth, loan loss provisions ratio, liquidity ratio, and independence 
dummy are expected to affect banks' future risk taking. On the other hand, the capital-to-
assets ratio and the average tax rate may affect a bank’s desire to issue subordinated debt. 
In addition, I specify exact matching by country and year so that matched banks operate 
in common macro and bank regulation environment.39  
4.3. Sample  
The sample consists of all publicly listed commercial banks and bank holding 
companies (hereafter referred to as banking firms) in Bankscope, a commercial database 
on major international banks, from 2002 to 2008 that have the needed data items 
available.40 There are two reasons for choosing publicly listed banking firms. First, 
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 More precisely, the control banks for a particular year have not had subordinated debt on their balance 
sheets from 1996 up to that year.  Bankscope imposes a time limit on coverage of individual banks’ 
historical data. 
 
39
 In implementation, I also explicitly specify GDP per capita, capital regulation index, supervisory power 
index, and disclosure-insurance index among the covariates used in the matching because these variables 
are to be used in the bias correction. See Abadie and Imbens (2002) and Abadie et al. (2004) for details. 
 
40
 I use bank consolidated statements. However, to keep as many observations as possible, if a bank does 
not issue consolidated statement, I use its unconsolidated account (the financial statement of a firm that 
does not have controlling interests in any other firms is, by definition, unconsolidated). The advantage of 
using consolidated accounts is that internal transactions are canceled out. Proposals for a mandatory 
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focusing on publicly listed banking firms enhances comparability across countries with 
respect to accounting standards. Second, I assume that it is easier for banking firms that 
have equity listed to issue publicly traded subordinated debt, which is necessary for 
indirect market discipline. This procedure will leave out the publicly traded subordinated 
debt issued by banking firms that do not have equity listed, and include the privately 
placed subordinated debt of banking firms that have equity listed. The inclusion of some 
privately placed subordinated debt in the analysis is likely to bias against finding strong 
evidence of market discipline since indirect market discipline is virtually not possible 
with this type of subordinated debt.  
I begin the sample in 2002 to make use of the first World Bank survey on national 
bank regulations. I exclude banks from countries not included in the World Bank 
database. The sample where the subordinated debt measure is the ratio of subordinated 
debt to total liabilities (hereafter referred to as Sample I) is comprised of 1,115 banking 
firms from 77 countries with 4,442 firm-year observations. The sample where the 
subordinated debt measure is the ratio of subordinated debt to risk-weighted assets 
(hereafter referred to as Sample II) consists of 776 banking firms from 53 countries with 
2,280 firm-year observations.  
Sample II is noticeably smaller than Sample I for two reasons. First, as mentioned 
earlier, not all bank-year observations with non-missing value of raw subordinated debt 
have data on Total Capital and Total Capital Ratio and/or Tier 1 Capital and Tier 1 
Capital Ratio available. Second, to make sure that the risk-weighted assets derived from 
these numbers are reliable, I keep only firm-year observations where the ratio of the two 
values of risk-weighted assets obtained from Total Capital/Total Capital Ratio and Tier 1 
Capital/Tier 1 Capital Ratio is within the [0.95, 1.05] range, i.e. when the values obtained 
from the two ways of calculation are sufficiently close.41 Firm-year observations where 
                                                                                                                                                                             
subordinated debt policy in the US request that banks issue subordinated debt to outside investors for it to 
have disciplinary effects (See, e.g. Kwast et al., 1999, Calomiris, 1999). I address potential issues 
associated with using unconsolidated accounts in Chapter V. 
 
41
 For observations with available data on either Total Capital and Total Capital Ratio or Tier 1 Capital and 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio but not both, I check manually and delete  an observation if reporting error is observed 
(e.g. the same numbers are reported for the capital and capital ratio). Besides, between the Total Capital 
and the Tier 1 Capital, it is much easier to check for the reliability of the reported Tier 1 Capital (its main 
components are voting common shareholders' equity and disclosed reserves or retained earnings, however, 
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the subordinated debt amount is zero are automatically retained because the ratio of 
subordinated debt to risk-weighted assets is zero regardless of the value of risk-weighted 
assets.42 
Table II presents summary statistics of variables. In each sample, variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to lessen the influence of outliers. While the 
mean subordinated debt ratio may appear too small, 1.45% of risk-weighted assets and 
1.09% of total liabilities, as mentioned earlier, proposals for a mandatory subordinated 
debt policy in the US typically suggest a required minimum ratio of 2% or 3% of risk-
weighted assets. For the subsample of banking firms with a positive subordinated debt 
ratio,43 the mean (median) value is 3.02% (2.86%) of risk-weighted assets and 2.26% 
(2.08%) of total liabilities. 
Recall that subordinated debt is expected to provide market discipline only on 
banks that are clearly going concerns (Kwast el al., 1999). The natural logarithm of the z-
score is used in the analysis; hence, by design, observations with non-positive raw z-
score are dropped from the final sample.44 In addition, only 1.96% (1.62%) of Sample I 
(II) has a z-score (measured in log) that is less than one (a z-score, measured in log, of 
one corresponds to return realization having to fall by approximately 2.72 standard 
deviations in order to deplete equity). Therefore, the vast majority of observations used in 
the analysis are from banking firms that are clearly going concerns. 
Appendix B - Table A presents the distribution of subordinated debt issuers using 
Sample I, the larger sample, hence, more representative of subordinated debt issuers over 
the period under study. Only firm-year observations with a positive subordinated debt 
ratio (and other main variables available) are used. Over time, the number of firm-year 
observations with a positive subordinated debt ratio increases significantly in the second 
                                                                                                                                                                             
other additions and subtractions are possible). Thus, I compute total risk-weighted assets as Tier 1 Capital 
divided by Tier 1 Capital Ratio for bank-year observations that remain in the sample. 
 
42
 Approximately 75% of observations with available data on Total Capital and Total Capital Ratio and/or 
Tier 1 Capital and Tier 1 Capital Ratio (and other main data items) are retained. The results hold 
qualitatively if the [0.90, 1.10] range is used. 
 
43
 2,146 observations (out of 4,442) in Sample I and 1,093 observations (out of 2,280) in Sample II have a 
positive subordinated debt ratio. 
 
44
 30 (14) observations with non-positive raw z-score are dropped from Sample I (II) as a result. 
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half of the period, and the ratio of subordinated debt to liabilities is slightly higher. 
Across countries, approximately 47.16% of observations with a positive subordinated 
debt ratio are associated with US banking firms. This, however, understates the size of 
subordinated debt markets outside the US and the potential for market discipline from 
such markets. Recall that this study examines only a subset of banking firms, namely, the 
publicly listed ones. In addition, the sample size is further constrained by the availability 
of the main variables used in the analysis. In the absence of these constraints, US banking 
firms account for approximately 41.76% of observations with a positive subordinated 
debt amount that are recorded in the Bankscope database over the period 2002-2007. 
The sample used in the event study to estimate the average treatment effect on 
bank risk taking one year after the first subordinated debt issuance includes 1,759 
observations, among them 286 are treated. Treated banks with no available data for the 
two years before the treatment are dropped from the sample for estimating the average 
treatment effect on bank risk taking one year before the first subordinated debt issuance. 
This sample consists of 1,549 observations, among them 264 are treated.  
Appendix B - Table B shows the distribution of subordinated debt first issuances 
over the sample period of 2003-2007. Only a change in raw subordinated debt from zero 
to positive for the first time since 1996 is counted as first issuance. Other changes, such 
as from positive to zero to positive, from positive to missing to positive, from zero to 
missing to positive, from missing to positive, are ignored. The number of subordinated 
debt first issuances reported here for the period 2003-2007 is higher than the number of 
first issuances actually included in the matching analysis because the latter is subject to 
the availability of counterfactuals and data used for matching. Similarly, an observation 
used in forming the distribution of subordinated debt first issuances might not belong to 
the final Sample I if a main variable is not available in a given period.45 Over time, the 
number of first issuances is observed to have increased by an order of magnitude in 2005. 
Across countries, the substantial increase in first issuances in 2005 is entirely accounted 
for by US banking firms. Overall, US firms account for about 82.72% of subordinated 
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 Recall that in regression analysis, independent variables are lagged by one year, while in the one-year-
after-the-first-issuance matching analysis, treated and controls are matched based on characteristics 
observed two years before the outcome. 
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debt first issuances carried out by publicly listed banking firms around the world over the 
period 2003-2007. 
Market and liquidity conditions do not decisively explain the surge in the US in 
2005. Specifically, movements in the growth rate in industrial production, 5-year 
Treasury yields, and the CBOE and S&P 500 Volatility Index are supposedly associated 
with lower credit spreads; on the other hand, movements in the slope of the yield curve, 
TED spread, and S&P buy and hold return are supposedly associated with higher credit 
spreads.  
Regarding banking regulations, there are tighter standards for trust preferred 
securities around the time the data shows increased subordinated debt issuances. These 
trust preferred securities are structured to count as Tier 1 capital by the bank supervisors 
but their payments are deductible from corporate income taxes as an interest expense. 
With tighter regulatory standards for  trust preferred securities, it is possible that banking 
firms, in particular, the smaller ones, issue less trust preferred securities and start to issue 
more subordinated debt.46 
 
  
                                                          
46
 I thank Larry Wall for suggesting this substitution-effect explanation. 
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CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
5.1. Regression analysis 
5.1.1. Using ratio of subordinated debt to total risk-weighted assets 
In the first column of Table III, specification A is estimated using OLS. The 
coefficient on the ratio of subordinated debt to risk-weighted assets is significantly 
negative; however, it turns significantly positive in column 2 when 2SLS is used. The test 
of endogeneity47 strongly rejects the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the ratio of 
subordinated debt to risk-weighted assets. In addition, the F-test of excluded instruments 
strongly rejects the hypothesis that the instruments could be excluded from the first-stage 
regression, and the Hansen J test of overidentification48 does not reject the null 
hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the disturbance process. Overall, the 
tests do not reject the validity of the suggested instruments. Further, the result supports 
the view that subordinated debt has a mitigating effect on banks’ risk taking. Specifically, 
between two banks that start with the same levels of risk-weighted assets but have 
different amounts of subordinated debt on their balance sheets to support the risk-
weighted assets, the one with the higher amount of subordinated debt is associated with a 
higher distance to insolvency in the next period.  
The economic size of the coefficient on the subordinated debt ratio is 
consequential. A one standard deviation increase in the subordinated debt ratio (from 
1.45% to 3.26%) is associated with an increase in the natural logarithm of z-score of 0.40 
(from 3.77 to 4.17), which in turn is associated with a reduction in the upper bound of 
insolvency risk by 54.7% (from 0.053% to 0.024%). Alternatively, under the assumption 
                                                          
47
 The test of endogeneity is a regression-based test (in STATA 10) which is robust to heteroskedasticity 
and clustering. With an unadjusted variance-covariance matrix of parameter estimates, this regression-
based test is identical to the Wu-Hausman test. The test involves fitting the model by both OLS and 2SLS 
approaches and comparing the resulting coefficient vectors. Under the null hypothesis of exogeneity the 
two estimates differ only due to sampling error. In contrast, under the alternative hypothesis of 
endogeneity, they should differ because the 2SLS estimator is consistent while the OLS estimator is not. 
 
48
 In this test, the residuals from a 2SLS regression are regressed on all exogenous variables (both included 
exogenous regressors and excluded instruments). Under the null hypothesis that all instruments are 
uncorrelated with the error term, this regression should have a population R2 value of zero. 
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of normality of banks’ returns, the result is an increase in the number of standard 
deviations that a return realization has to fall in order to deplete equity by 49.2% (from 
43.38 to 64.72). Using the disclosure-insurance index in place of the private monitoring 
index in Column 3 produces an identical result since the pairwise correlation between the 
two indexes is above 0.99. Similar results are obtained when the bank regulation 
variables are not included in the model (Column 4 reports OLS estimates, and Column 5 
uses 2SLS). 
In Table IV, the sample is split at the median disclosure-insurance index, the 
median supervisory power index, and the median level of GDP per capita,49 respectively, 
to produce High and Low subsamples on the corresponding bank regulation index and 
economic development. The coefficient on subordinated debt to risk-weighted assets is 
positive and significant for all the High subsamples. The economic effect of having 
subordinated debt on the bank’s balance sheet could be large. For example, using the 
coefficient on the subordinated debt ratio for the High subsample on supervisory power 
index (Panel A Column 4), a one standard deviation increase in the subordinated debt 
ratio (from 1.45% to 3.26%) is associated with an increase in the natural logarithm of z-
score of 0.51 (from 3.77 to 4.28), which in turn is associated with a reduction in the upper 
bound of insolvency risk by 64.2% (from 0.053% to 0.019%). Alternatively, under the 
assumption of normality of banks’ returns, the result is an increase in the number of 
standard deviations that a return realization has to fall in order to deplete equity by 66.5% 
(from 43.38 to 72.24).  
For the Low subsamples, the coefficient on subordinated debt to risk-weighted 
assets is insignificant; however, the test of endogeneity does not reject the null hypothesis 
of exogeneity of the ratio of subordinated debt to risk-weighted assets. The OLS 
estimates for the Low subsamples in Panel B also show that subordinated debt does not 
have a significant effect on bank risk taking. Panels C and D report similar results when 
the bank regulation variables are excluded.  Overall, the results are consistent with the 
                                                          
49
 Each country-year contributes to determining the cut-offs. As a country may move from the Low 
subsample to the High subsample or vice versa over time, the sum of the number of clusters for the High 
and Low subsamples is not necessarily equal to the number of countries. The cut-offs for bank regulations 
are the same if the country medians or the yearly medians are used in determining the corresponding 
sample medians. Using the country-survey year in determining the cut-offs yields the same cut-offs for 
bank regulations. 
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prediction that there is some threshold level of national bank regulations and economic 
development above which subordinated debt could exert the desirable effect.50  
5.1.2. Using ratio of subordinated debt to total liabilities 
Table V reports the results obtained with Sample I. Once again, the evidence is 
consistent with subordinated debt having a mitigating effect on bank risk taking for the 
High subsamples. As the market discipline effect of subordinated debt is observed not 
only for banks that report the capital ratios, the paper’s main results do not appear to be 
driven by sample selection. 
5.1.3. Sample selection 
Table VI reports the result of estimating specification B. The coefficient on 
Report is insignificant in the outcome equation. Moreover, the null hypothesis that the 
correlation between the error term in the regression estimating the propensity to report 
the capital ratios and the error term in the outcome equation is zero is not rejected. Thus, 
a bank’s choice of reporting the capital ratios does not appear to be correlated with its 
future risk taking, consequently, the results obtained with Sample II – the sample of 
banks that report the capital ratios - should not suffer from sample selection bias.  
5.1.4. Additional robustness checks 
I estimate a cross-section regression where explanatory variables are measured in 
(up to) 2006, and bank risk taking is averaged over 2007-2008. This is to check if the 
result is sensitive to the ownership measure. Table VII presents the results for both 
Samples I and II. The main results hold. Thus, it appears that banks having subordinated 
debt right before the financial crisis are comparatively more stable during the crisis 
period. 
Among 53 countries in Sample II, the median US bank ranks 48th with respect to 
size. This is due to the overwhelming presence of small and medium-sized US banks in 
the final sample (and of US banks in the database in the first place51). To check if the 
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 Similar results are obtained when the sample is split at the median level of financial development or legal 
development instead of the median level of economic development. 
 
51
 The number of publicly listed Commercial Banks and Bank Holding Companies recorded in Bankscope 
at the end of 2008 that are from the US is almost half the total number. 
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result is driven by this peculiarity, I restrict the number of US banks in the sample to 200 
largest banking firms in terms of average size (large banks are also the primary targets of 
a mandatory subordinated debt policy). Of those, 181 banks have complete data on the 
main variables for at least one year. The resulting sample has 1,251 observations for 474 
banking firms. Table VIII presents the result for this sample and carries the same 
message about the mitigating effect of subordinated debt on bank risk taking. 
I address the issue that the regressions give more weight to countries with more 
observations by estimating a specification that weights each observation by the inverse of 
the number of observations from the same country and year. The result is reported in 
Table IX. For the High subsample on the disclosure-insurance index, the coefficient on 
subordinated debt ratio has the right sign but is not significant. For other High 
subsamples, the coefficient on subordinated debt ratio is statistically significant. 
I also carry out the analysis separately for the US and the non-US subsamples. In 
particular, for the US subsample, as it is a one-country study, I am able to specify a firm 
fixed effect model. The key results hold qualitatively for both subsamples. 
I assess potential issues associated with using unconsolidated financial statements 
in two ways. First, if other bank-level characteristics used in the analysis fail to capture 
systematic differences, if there is any, of banks with unconsolidated accounts, a dummy 
variable for these banks should mitigate this issue. The key results on subordinated debt 
hold in this specification (Appendix B – Table C, Panel A). Second, if subordinated debt 
issued by banks with unconsolidated accounts is not likely to exert the desirable effect on 
bank risk taking, e.g. because there is a possibility that the debt is issued to affiliated 
firms, these banks should be allowed both a different intercept and a different slope on 
the subordinated debt variable. Therefore, I extend the baseline specification with a 
dummy variable for banking firms with unconsolidated accounts and positive 
subordinated debt ratio, and an interaction term between this dummy and the 
subordinated debt ratio. This interaction term is treated as endogenous and is 
instrumented by the interaction terms between the dummy and each of the three 
variables: the average subordinated debt ratio of other banks in the same country, year 
and size group, the bank’s lagged equity-to-assets ratio, and the bank’s average tax rate. 
The key results hold for other banks. Moreover, the results also hold for banks with 
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unconsolidated accounts and positive subordinated debt ratio, as the hypothesis that the 
sum of the coefficients on the subordinated debt ratio and on the interaction term is 
statistically zero is rejected in most cases (Appendix B – Table C, Panel B). Further, 
dropping banks with unconsolidated accounts and positive subordinated debt ratio does 
not affect the key results. 
Finally, I check if the assumption of normality of banks' return holds in the data. 
As Bankscope imposes a constraint on coverage of individual banks’ historical data 
(maximum of 16 years), it is not feasible to directly compare the frequency distribution of 
bank returns with that of a normal distribution. However, the Studentized Range (David 
et al., 1954) allows for normality testing for samples of at least 3 observations. Therefore, 
I collect return data for all publicly listed banking firms in Bankscope that have data 
available for at least 3 years and compute the Studentized Range (SR) for each bank. 
With a conservative approach of excluding SR values that are below the 0.10 fractile or 
that exceed the 0.90 fractile of the distribution of SR in samples of 3 or more from a 
normal distribution, 79.71% of banks in this extensive sample have SR values that are 
quite consistent with the hypothesis of normality. If only SR values that are below the 
0.05 fractile or that exceed the 0.95 fractile are excluded, 87.92% of banks remain. The 
distribution of SR values for samples of banks that are actually used in the analysis is 
very similar to that for the above sample. The corresponding percentages for Sample I are 
79.02% and 88.79%; and the corresponding percentages for Sample II are 79.00% and 
88.66%. Overall, the data tells us that normality of banks’ returns does not appear to be 
an unrealistic assumption.52 This, in turn, supports the discussion of the economic 
significance of having subordinated debt on bank risk taking carried out earlier where 
normality of banks’ returns is assumed. 
5.1.5. Alternative measures of bank risk taking 
 The results reported above are robust to using alternative measures of bank risk 
taking. For illustration, Table X Panel A Columns 1-3 and 4-6 report the results for 
baseline regressions using Sample II (similar to the ones in Table IV Panel A Columns 2, 
4, and 6) where the standard deviation of return and the earnings volatility replace z-score 
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 The key results hold qualitatively when only banking firms from Sample II (I) that fit the normality 
assumption (with either approach of excluding SR values) are used in the analysis. 
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as the dependent variable. Panel B reports results using Sample I. Higher subordinated 
debt ratio is associated with lower risk taking. Specifically, the subordinated debt ratio 
enters negatively and significantly for all the High subsamples. The test of endogeneity 
substantiates the endogeneity concern, and the F-test of excluded instruments strongly 
rejects the hypothesis that the instruments could be excluded from the first-stage 
regression in all cases. The Hansen J test of overidentification does not reject the null 
hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the disturbance process in most 
cases except for the High subsample on the disclosure-insurance index in Panel A. All 
other robustness tests produce qualitatively similar results. In sum, the results emphasize 
a robust relation between subordinated debt and bank risk taking. 
5.1.6. The impact of changes in subordinated debt on changes in bank risk taking over 
the same time period 
The conducted analysis examines the impact of the level of subordinated debt 
ratio on banks’ future risk taking and utilizes within-countries across-banks variations. In 
this subsection, I investigate how a change in a bank’s subordinated debt ratio affects the 
change in bank risk taking over the same period. The dependent variable is the change in 
risk taking from time t-1 to t. The change in subordinated debt ratio is measured over the 
same period. Control variables are measured at t-1. The instruments for the change in 
subordinated debt ratio are the change in average subordinated debt ratio of other banks 
in the same country, year and size group, the change in the bank's lagged equity-to-assets 
ratio, and the change in the bank’s average tax rate. The results are presented in Table XI. 
The dependent variable in Panel A is the change in z-score, while in Panels B and C it is 
replaced by the change in standard deviation of return and the change in earnings 
volatility, respectively. The results are generally consistent with subordinated debt having 
a mitigating effect on bank risk taking. A positive change in the subordinated debt ratio is 
associated with a positive change in the z-score for the High subsample on economic 
development, while a positive change in the subordinated debt ratio is associated with a 
negative change in the standard deviation of return and the earnings volatility for the 
High subsamples on the disclosure-insurance index and economic development. The 
changes-on-changes regression has less power than the regressions in levels conducted 
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earlier because it depends more on the limited within-banks variations in subordinated 
debt ratio. 
5.1.7. Other uninsured liabilities  
 In principle, any uninsured bank obligation can potentially provide market 
discipline. Short-term uninsured liabilities subject banking firms to frequent exposure to 
market judgment. In fact, the interest rates paid on large, uninsured Certificate of 
Deposits (CD), have been found to be positively and significantly associated with 
accounting risk measures and examiners’ ratings. Even the largest US banks, which 
would be perceived to be “too big to fail”, were shown by Keeley (1990) and Ellis and 
Flannery (1992) to have risk premiums embedded in their CD rates. On the other hand, 
the long maturity of long-term uninsured liabilities magnifies the risk sensitivity of their 
holders, thus enhancing their incentives to monitor bank risk, and at the same time, 
provides the extra benefit of preventing runs on banks. 
 I investigate whether the mitigating effect of subordinated debt on banks' future 
risk taking is distinct from any potential effect of other uninsured liabilities by adding 
proxy variables for other types of uninsured debt to regression specification A. These 
variables are short-term uninsured debt, other long-term uninsured debt, or other 
uninsured debt which is the sum of the short-term and other long-term uninsured debt. 
All of these measures are normalized by the bank’s total risk-weighted assets. Recall that 
Sample II keeps firm-year observations where the ratio of the two values of risk-weighted 
assets obtained from Total Capital/Total Capital Ratio and Tier 1 Capital/Tier 1 Capital 
Ratio is within the [0.95, 1.05] range, but automatically retains observations where the 
subordinated debt amount is zero because the ratio of subordinated debt to risk-weighted 
assets is zero regardless of the value of risk-weighted assets. However, in this subsection, 
due to the inclusion of other uninsured debt, all observations must satisfy the [0.95, 1.05] 
range condition53,54 (and have data on other uninsured liabilities available). 
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 Dropping from the final sample 148 observations from countries that answer “No” to both questions “Is 
there an explicit deposit insurance protection system?” and “Were insured depositors wholly compensated 
(to the extent of legal protection) the last time a bank failed?” does not change the result qualitatively. 
 
54
 Using Sample I and normalizing uninsured debt by total liabilities produce qualitatively similar results. 
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 Table XII presents the results of estimating extended versions of specification A 
for each of the High subsamples. Conditioning on other uninsured liabilities, 
subordinated debt ratio continues to enter the z-score regression positively and 
significantly. In Columns 5-7 of each panel, like subordinated debt, the other uninsured 
debt is treated as endogenous, and is instrumented by the bank's lagged equity-to-assets 
ratio and its average tax rate. Banking firms are subject to capital regulation; hence a 
bank’s leverage is likely to be related to its leverage in the previous period. And a higher 
tax rate means higher benefit from deduction of interest payments on debt. The key 
results on subordinated debt are robust to the ways other uninsured debt is treated. Higher 
subordinated debt is associated with lower future risk taking as evidenced by the positive 
and significant coefficient on subordinated debt ratio in the z-score regression, and 
negative and significant coefficients on subordinated debt ratio in the standard deviation 
of return and earnings volatility regressions. At the same time, other uninsured debt does 
not appear to have a mitigating effect on banks' future risk taking. In sum, subordinated 
debt, which stands out with its most junior status and a longer maturity than most large 
CDs and other uninsured bank liabilities, does appear to be the best choice for providing 
increased market discipline, as argued by advocates of increased use of subordinated debt 
as a market discipline instrument in banking firms. 
5.1.8. Bank-level corporate governance 
As mentioned in Chapter IV, for most countries participating in the World Bank 
surveys, subordinated debt is allowable, but not required, as a source of capital. 
Nevertheless, 48.31% (47.94%) of firm-year observations in Sample I (II) have a positive 
subordinated debt ratio. A bank’s decision on whether or not to issue subordinated debt 
and how much subordinated debt to have on its balance sheet could be interpreted as 
reflecting the bank’s attempt to choose a level of monitoring that maximizes the bank’s 
expected value. In this optimization problem, bank risk is subject to banking supervision, 
and a higher level of monitoring is plausibly associated with a lower level of default risk. 
Both the costs and the benefits of monitoring are factored into the bank’s decision. On 
one hand, too much monitoring may hurt managerial initiative and consequently lower 
bank performance and worsen bank valuation. In addition, equity holders, due to the 
option-like feature of their claim, can have incentives to increase risk taking. On the other 
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hand, a lower default probability provides certain benefits, e.g. in the form of reduced 
funding and operation costs.  
 In a broader context, a bank’s choice of the level of monitoring by external 
investors is an aspect of the bank’s corporate governance. Hence, there is a need to study 
the effect of subordinated debt in conjunction with the effect of other corporate 
governance practices. To ascertain whether subordinated debt has an independent, 
incremental effect on bank risk taking, in an extended version of the baseline regression 
specification, I control for the common corporate governance attributes, using 
constructed indexes that encompass board of directors, audit, anti-takeover, and 
managerial compensation/ownership. 
 As mentioned before, bank-level corporate governance data provided by the 
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) is available for US firms only. As a result, the 
analysis in this subsection is reduced to a one-country study. Out of 483 US banking 
firms in Sample II, 297 have governance data with a total of 779 observations. 8.7% of 
these firms are in the S&P 400, S&P 500, or S&P 600 indexes, 36.4% in the Russell 
3000, and the remaining 54.9% outside the Russell 3000. Out of 593 US banking firms in 
Sample I, 360 have governance data with a total of 1,653 observations. 10.3% of these 
firms are in the S&P 400, S&P 500, or S&P 600 indexes, 32.8% in the Russell 3000, and 
the remaining 56.9% outside the Russell 3000. In both samples, compared to banks that 
do not have governance data, banks with governance data available on average are larger 
and issue more subordinated debt. 
 Table XIII presents the results of this one-country study.55 In Panel A, without 
firm fixed effects (but standard errors are clustered at the firm level), the key results on 
subordinated debt hold qualitatively when standard deviation of return and earnings 
volatility are used as risk measures, whether or not a governance measure is included in 
the regression. In other words, it does not appear that the observed effect of subordinated 
debt is absorbed by the governance measure. When z-score is used as the risk measure, 
the coefficient on subordinated debt ratio has the wrong sign and is marginally significant 
(it is insignificant with Sample I).  
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 I report the results where the governance index is expressed as a percentage. Results are qualitatively 
similar with alternative governance measures discussed in subsection 4.1.3. 
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 In Panel B, with firm fixed effects, subordinated debt ratio enters insignificantly 
in all cases, whether or not a governance measure is included in the regression. One 
potential explanation for this result is that the time dimension of the panel data used in 
this analysis is too limited with the average number of years being 2.6; this in effect 
renders the firm fixed effects model not suitable. For comparison, for the whole US 
sample which consists of both banks that have and that do not have governance data and 
for which the average number of years is 3.2, the key results on subordinated debt hold 
qualitatively when firm fixed effects are included.  
5.1.9. When subordinated debt is not expected to exert market discipline effects 
I test the fourth hypothesis that the disciplinary effect of subordinated debt is 
expected to be nonexistent or, at most, weaker in too-big-to-fail banks and banks in 
which the government has a considerable stake by adding a dummy variable for too-big-
to-fail/state-owned banks and an interaction term between the subordinated debt ratio and 
the too-big-to-fail/state-owned dummy in specification A. While the coefficient on the 
subordinated debt ratio is expected to be positive in the z-score regression, the coefficient 
on the interaction term between the subordinated debt ratio and the too-big-to-fail/state-
owned dummy is expected to be negative so that overall there is a weaker or no market 
discipline effect of subordinated debt in too-big-to-fail/state-owned banking firms. The 
too-big-to-fail dummy takes value 1 if the bank’s share in the country’s total deposits 
exceeds 10%.56 The state-owned dummy takes value 1 if the largest shareholder of the 
bank is classified as a State or Public authority. The interaction term between the 
subordinated debt ratio and the too-big-to-fail/state-owned dummy, which is treated as 
endogenous because of the endogeneity of the subordinated debt measure, is 
instrumented by the interaction terms between the too-big-to-fail/state-owned dummy 
and each of the three variables: the average subordinated debt ratio of other banks in the 
same country, year and size group, the bank’s lagged equity-to-assets ratio, and the 
bank’s average tax rate.  
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 Caprio et al. (2007), Laeven and Levine (2009) define a bank as too-big-to-fail if the bank’s share in the 
country’s total deposits exceeds 10%. 
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The results of estimating these extended versions of specification A are reported 
in Table XIV and are generally consistent with the hypothesis that subordinated debt does 
not work as a market discipline instrument in too-big-to-fail and state-owned banks. 
Specifically, in Panel A, while subordinated debt has a mitigating impact on risk taking, 
this effect is largely offset for state-owned banks. The null hypothesis that the sum of the 
coefficients on the subordinated debt ratio and on the interaction term between the 
subordinated debt ratio and the state-owned dummy is zero is not rejected in most cases. 
Panel B shows similar results for too-big-to-fail banks. As a robustness check, I also use 
different cutoffs for a bank’s share in the country’s total deposits to define too-big-to-fail 
banks, 15% in Panel C and 20% in Panel D. The results are consistent with the 
hypothesis. 
5.2. Event study 
 Table XV Panels A and B present the results of estimating the average treatment 
effect on bank risk taking one year after and one year before the treatment, respectively. 
The results are reported for the High subsamples57 and for all three measures of bank risk 
taking. In each case, the number of matches is specified to be 1, 2, and 3. In Panel A, the 
results are robust when standard deviation of return is used as the measure of bank risk 
taking. The estimated average effect of issuing subordinated debt on issuing banks is 
always significant and in the right direction.  Also, when matched with the nearest and 
second nearest non-issuing banks, issuing banks on average experience an increase in z-
score one year later that is statistically significant in all cases except one. The result is 
weaker when earnings volatility is used as the measure of bank risk taking – the average 
treatment effect on treated banks is also in the right direction but not always significant. 
Overall, the results show that the average effect of issuing subordinated debt is a 
reduction in bank risk taking for issuing banks in the year after the issuance. This is 
consistent with the results obtained using regression analysis.  
On the other hand, the results in Panel B do not support Niu (2008)’s model 
implication that banking firms reduce their risk before they issue subordinated debt. 
When z-score is used as the outcome measure, the results even suggest that there is a 
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 The results for the Low subsamples are mostly insignificant and are not reported in a table. 
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reduction in bank stability in the year before the issuance; however, when standard 
deviation of return and earnings volatility are used as measures of bank risk taking, the 
average effect of issuing subordinated debt on bank risk taking for issuing banks in the 
year before the issuance is not significantly different from zero.58 In sum, there is no 
evidence that banking firms reduce their risk taking in the year before they issue 
subordinated debt.  
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 When the outcome is specified to be the change in z-score from year t-1 to t+1, the average effect is a 
positive and significant change in z-score for issuing firms. 
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CHAPTER VI 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 Empirical results in the last chapter are consistent with subordinated debt exerting 
market discipline on banking firms. Market discipline may be imposed on banking firms 
whenever they choose to issue risk-sensitive subordinated debt; however, a policy that 
requires subordinated debt issuance would, in principle, enhance market discipline. 
Mandatory issuance ensures that a banking firm incurs higher cost of funds if it opts for 
higher risk and therefore may limit banking firm risk taking. Further, mandatory issuance 
compels disclosure to the market about the firm's current condition and future prospects, 
which refreshes secondary market prices. This, in turn, facilitates market and supervisory 
interpretations of the signals about banking firm risk. A subordinated debt requirement 
might also encourage some banks to boost their total capital ratios, thereby providing 
extra protection for the deposit insurance agency and tax payers. 
 However, a subordinated debt requirement might have adverse macroeconomic 
effects. First, setting the required level of subordinated debt capital at a higher share of 
risk weighted assets than banking firms would otherwise choose would raise the cost of 
financial intermediation (putting upward pressure on loan rates and downward pressure 
on deposit rates and profits), thereby causing a reduction in the level of intermediation 
and possibly a less efficient resource allocation. Second, given the subordinate status of 
subordinated debt, its cost would be more sensitive to economic conditions than that of 
other bank liabilities; as a result, bank lending might become more pro-cyclical with a 
subordinated debt requirement in place.59 
 Furthermore, a mandatory subordinated debt policy would impose additional 
private costs if it causes banking firms to substantially deviate from their existing debt 
composition. Rauh and Sufi (2010) show that, for non-financial firms, debt structure 
varies across the credit quality distribution. In particular, the lower the credit quality of 
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 Kwast et al. (1999) also discuss other potential costs. First, although subordinated debt holders cannot 
run, the signals provided by subordinated debt markets may encourage "runs" by other uninsured creditors 
with potential systemic risk implications; however, such a cost would be common to any requirements 
aiming at enhancing information disclosure and transparency. Second, a cost of all forms of market 
discipline is that they reduce the flexibility of supervisors at times when reduced flexibility appears to be a 
significant problem, i.e. when the value of regulatory discretion outweighs the cost of forbearance from a 
social perspective.  
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the firm, the higher the spread of the types and priority structure of its debt. This is both a 
cross-sectional and within-firm phenomenon. They interpret the findings as consistent 
with optimal debt priority and composition being set to mitigate incentive conflicts. The 
study's implication is that a firm’s optimal capital structure should be thought of not only 
in terms of the firm’s leverage ratio, but also in terms of its debt composition. This in turn 
is relevant in the context of subordinated debt requirement for banking firms, since such a 
requirement could potentially lead to changes in banking firms’ debt composition.  
 For the subsample of banking firms with a positive subordinated debt ratio, the 
mean (median) value is 3.02% (2.86%) of risk-weighted assets and 2.26% (2.08%) of 
total liabilities. A required subordinated debt ratio of 2% to 3% of risk-weighted assets, 
as typically suggested in mandatory subordinated debt policy proposals in the US, is quite 
close to the level currently chosen by banks that issue subordinated debt and, hence, is 
likely to make the above-mentioned adverse macroeconomic effects modest. Also, a 
mandatory policy that is based on existing market conventions may not cause banking 
firms to substantially deviate from their existing debt composition and/or impose an 
excessive regulatory burden on banking firms. 
 For countries with a relatively large number of banks in the sample, there is a 
positive correlation between bank size and the presence of subordinated debt on the 
bank’s balance sheet. The mean (median) size of banking firms that issue subordinated 
debt is 5.58 (3.33) billion US dollars, while the corresponding number for banking firms 
that do not issue subordinated debt is 700.09 (619.08) million US dollars. Given that the 
larger banks have already voluntarily issued subordinated debt, applying a mandatory 
policy to large banks alone would reduce the cost of the requirement considerably. Also, 
with a required subordinated debt ratio of 2% to 3% of risk-weighted assets, it is likely 
that only large banks can issue subordinated debt in amounts sufficient to provide a liquid 
secondary market for the debt.60 
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 On the other hand, as pointed out in Lang and Robertson (2002), because most small banks rely heavily 
on insured deposits, are not publicly listed, and have not issued subordinated debt, they are subject to 
minimal amounts of market discipline. Therefore, applying a subordinated debt requirement to small banks 
would introduce market discipline where almost none exists. One way to make this feasible is to have 
subordinated debt issued by small banks be privately placed with institutional investors.  
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 While subordinated debt is potentially an important tool to enhance market 
discipline and mitigate excessive risk taking, it certainly cannot prevent excessive risk 
taking altogether, especially in the presence of distortions that undermine its 
effectiveness. For example, the analysis in subsection 5.1.9 shows that having 
subordinated debt in place is not associated with less risk taking in too-big-to-fail banks. 
The evidence does not necessarily downplay the role of subordinated debt in enhancing 
market discipline for the ultimate goal of reducing the likelihood of systemic risk, as 
destabilizing forces could arise from multiple smaller banks. However, it underscores the 
importance of serious consideration of a package of reforms that aim to stabilize the 
financial system and eliminate the too-big-to-fail issue.  
 One proposed reform is to have banks issue claims that behave like subordinated 
debt during normal times and automatically convert to additional equity when a bank's 
original shareholders' equity is depleted. These claims are referred to as reverse 
convertible debt or contingent capital.61 Reverse convertible debt is argued to (1) provide 
a transparent mechanism for un-levering a firm when it appears that the firm should have 
less debt in its capital structure, i.e. in bad times, but preserve the disciplinary effect and 
tax benefits of debt in good times; (2) generate lower bankruptcy costs through the 
automatic conversion of debt into equity, alleviate the debt overhang problem, and 
mitigate the negative signaling effect of equity issuance when these problems are most 
severe; and (3) decrease too-big-to-fail government assistance by reducing the likelihood 
of financial distress.  
 However, there are many complications with designing the triggers and 
conversion rules to make reverse convertible debt an effective cushion and to prevent 
potential for manipulation by investors or managers, especially close to times when the 
triggers are potentially reached. For example, a trigger which is specified on the bank's 
regulatory capital ratio would be subject to the problem of stale accounting data and 
political pressure; on the other hand, a market-valued trigger would rely on equity market 
efficiency, which can fail due to stock price manipulation and panic. As for conversion 
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 Prominent examples of contingent capital proposals are: Flannery (2005, 2009), McDonald (2009), 
French et al. (2010), Pennacchi (2010), Sundaresan and Wang (2010), Pennacchi et al. (2010). Over 2009-
2010, Lloyds Banking Group, Rabobank, and Yorkshire Building Society have issued securities that might 
be broadly classified as contingent capital (Pennacchi et al., 2010). 
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rules, assuming that the trigger is based on stock prices, conversion of contingent capital 
into equity at the bond's face value would create incentives for bondholders to short 
shares to trigger conversion; on the other hand, conversion of contingent capital into 
equity at a discount to the bond's face value might encourage higher risk taking and/or 
give managers/shareholders incentives to induce conversion as a means of selling equity 
cheaply. The Call Option Enhanced Reverse Convertibles (COERC) recently proposed 
by Pennacchi et al. (2010) force the firm to issue equity at a discount to bondholders 
when the firm is in financial distress but give equity holders the option to repay the debt 
to avoid dilutive conversion. As the risk of the debt holders is reduced, the debt 
instrument is more marketable than traditional reverse convertibles; and since 
shareholders can avoid the conversion by repaying the debt, they are not hurt by 
conversions driven by irrational stock price behavior or manipulation.  
 In addition to the operational complications, there are many other complications 
that arise with contingent capital. In particular, while automatic conversion allows 
distressed banks to bypass costly insolvency proceedings, when the bank is in difficulties, 
reverse convertible debt holders' attempts to sell it before the conditions for conversion 
arise might just shift frictions forward in time. Moreover, Hart and Zingales (2010b) 
point out that, by eliminating the threat of potential default, which forces restructuring of 
inefficient businesses and replacement of incompetent managers, reverse convertible debt 
may introduce more inefficiency in the banking sector. Finally, as argued by Admati et 
al. (2010), if the holders of reverse convertible debt are sufficiently important, 
government temptation to bail them out could be no less than it is for subordinated debt 
holders; in other words, if the main problem is the government’s inability to refrain from 
bailing out creditors of financial institutions, reverse convertible debt is not expected to 
solve this problem. 
 Significantly raising the bank equity capital requirement is another recently 
proposed regulatory reform. Admati et al. (2010) argue that the observed high leverage of 
banks does not necessarily imply that debt is the socially optimal way to fund bank 
activities. Rather, it is because public policies, through taxes and government guarantees, 
subsidize debt financing. The resulting high leverage is socially harmful in view of the 
potential systemic risk that it brings about. Therefore, they suggest that regulators use 
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significantly higher equity requirements to maintain the health and stability of the 
financial system. This could be achieved by limiting payouts and potentially mandating 
equity issuance by all regulated institutions for a period of time (to remove the negative 
signaling effect of equity issuance). It is argued that setting equity requirements 
significantly higher than the current level would entail large social benefits, as banking 
firms' current high leverage is the source of fragility and systemic risk.   
 However, given that public policies subsidize debt financing and that these 
policies are not expected to significantly change in a foreseeable future, a regulation that 
aims to change banking firms’ capital structure substantially by way of significantly 
increasing the equity capital buffer could impose significant private costs on these 
banking firms  as well as social costs. Specifically, as public policies in effect subsidize 
debt financing and penalize equity financing, a higher equity capital requirement raises 
banks' costs of funding.62 This in turn may lead to reduction of loan supply and economic 
growth. In addition, Kashyap et al. (2008) argue that high equity in good times gives 
managers significant discretion and provides opportunities for them to destroy value in 
negative net present value projects; hence, regulatory pressure to significantly increase 
bank equity capital may create agency problems. Also, any attempt to impose regulation 
against the interest of banks' shareholders will likely encourage regulatory arbitrage, 
where banking activities are moved out of the regulated part of the financial system and 
into the unregulated part, the so-called shadow banking system; the goal is to reduce 
banks' regulatory capital requirements with little or no reduction in their overall risks. 
This practice would render the regulation ineffective or even harmful. 
 Assuming that the proposed reform is operationally feasible, increased equity 
requirements and using subordinated debt are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
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 Regarding the effect of increased equity requirements on  banks' funding costs, Admati et al. (2010) 
make a valid point that when the bank is funded with more equity, a given fluctuation in earnings translates 
into a smaller fluctuation in return on equity, hence, the risk premium in the expected return on equity will 
be lower; further, if the additional equity capital serves to reduce the bank's bankruptcy risk, the interest 
rate on its debt will also be lower. Therefore, they conclude that increased capital requirements need not 
raise the bank's total funding costs. However, the observed high leverage of banking firms more likely 
imply that, from shareholders' perspective, in the presence of tax subsidies and underpriced explicit and 
implicit guarantees, the costs of increasing equity financing outweigh the benefits. Admati et al. (2010) also 
argue that if subsidies are necessary for some activities performed by banks, they should be given in ways 
that do not lead to excessive leverage. While the argument itself is valid, the feasibility of radically 
reforming public policies in a foreseeable future is in doubt. 
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Additional equity can be added to banks’ capital structure on top of existing deposits and 
subordinated debt. Doing so will further reduce incentives for risk-shifting without 
sacrificing the disciplining function of debt. 
 Finally, Poole (2009)'s reform proposal is for banks to maintain a substantial 
block of subordinated debt in their capital structure. Specifically, every bank must issue 
10-year subordinated debt equal to 10% of its liabilities. The bank must refinance one-
tenth of its subordinated debt every year or shrink otherwise. He further suggests that the 
US government restructure its existing support for banks by buying these banks' 
subordinated debt but keeping a senior status to other existing subordinated debt holders. 
While the specifics of this proposal are debatable, the suggested way of restructuring 
government support would allow the government to have a clear schedule for 
withdrawing federal special assistance and forcing banks to stand on their own. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
 In this study, I investigate (1) whether having subordinated debt in place mitigates 
bank risk taking and (2) whether national bank regulations and economic development 
affect the relation between subordinated debt and bank risk taking. Answers to these 
questions have important policy implications in view of growing concern among policy 
makers about banking firms’ excessive risk taking and increasing interest in using 
subordinated debt as an instrument to augment market discipline of banking firms.  
 Using a variety of robustness tests, my study provides evidence supporting the 
view that subordinated debt has a mitigating effect on bank risk taking. The effect is 
consequential in the crisis period. Moreover, the risk mitigating effect appears to be a 
distinctive feature of subordinated debt as a type of bank obligation. The evidence thus 
supports proposals calling for increased use of subordinated debt in banking firms. In 
addition, the results are consistent with theories that the mitigating impact of 
subordinated debt on bank risk taking depends crucially on national bank regulations and 
economic development. Therefore, if a policy that requires subordinated debt as a part of 
banking firms’ regulatory capital is to be implemented, it should be carried out in 
conjunction with creating necessary institutional conditions for subordinated debt to exert 
the intended effect on bank risk taking.   
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APPENDIX A 
TABLES 
 
Table I: Variable Definition and Sources 
Variable Definition Source 
Z-score Distance to insolvency, equal to the return on average total 
assets plus the equity capital-assets ratio divided by the 
standard deviation of the return on average total assets 
computed over a moving window of 4 years. The natural 
logarithm of the z-score is used in the analysis 
Own calculation using 
data from Bankscope 
Standard deviation of return Standard deviation of return on assets computed over a 
moving window of 4 years 
Own calculation using 
data from Bankscope 
Earnings volatility Standard deviation of the ratio of total earnings before taxes 
and loan loss provisions to average total assets, computed 
over a moving window of 4 years 
Own calculation using 
data from Bankscope 
SND/RWA Ratio of subordinated debt to risk-weighted assets, where 
the amount of risk-weighted assets is computed as Tier 1 
Capital divided by Tier 1 Capital Ratio 
Own calculation using 
data from Bankscope 
SND/TL Ratio of subordinated debt to total liabilities Own calculation using 
data from Bankscope 
Bureau Van Dijk Independence 
Indicator 
A dummy that takes value one if there is no shareholder 
having more than 25% of direct or total ownership 
 
Bankscope 
Demand deposits ratio Ratio of demand deposits to total deposits 
 
Own calculation using 
data from Bankscope 
Size 
 
The natural logarithm of total assets in thousands of US 
dollars 
 
Own calculation using 
data from Bankscope 
Loan growth Growth in net loans with respect to previous year Own calculation using 
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data from Bankscope 
Loan loss provisions ratio Ratio of loan loss provisions to net interest income Own calculation using 
data from Bankscope 
Liquidity ratio Ratio of liquid assets to liquid liabilities Own calculation using 
data from Bankscope 
Leverage Ratio of total liabilities to total assets Own calculation using 
data from Bankscope 
Lagged equity-to-assets ratio Ratio of equity to total assets Own calculation using 
data from Bankscope 
Average SND ratio The average SND ratio of other banks in the same country, 
year, and size group 
Own calculation using 
data from Bankscope 
Tax rate Tax expense divided by profit before tax Own calculation using 
data from Bankscope 
Report A dummy variable that takes value 1 if the bank reports 
either the Total Capital Ratio and Total Capital or Tier 1 
Capital Ratio and Tier 1 Capital, and zero otherwise 
Own calculation using 
data from Bankscope 
Accounting standard A dummy variable that takes value 1 if the bank reports 
according to IAS, IFRS, Regulatory standard, or local 
GAAP (for US banks only), and zero otherwise 
Own calculation using 
data from Bankscope 
Short-term uninsured debt Deposits and short-term funding less total deposits, divided 
by risk-weighted assets (total liabilities) 
Own calculation using 
data from Bankscope 
Other long-term uninsured debt Total other funding less SND, divided by risk-weighted 
assets (total liabilities) 
Own calculation using 
data from Bankscope 
Other uninsured debt Sum of short-term and other long-term uninsured debt Own calculation using 
data from Bankscope 
State-owned dummy A dummy variable that takes value 1 if the largest 
shareholder of the bank is classified as a State, Public 
authority 
Own calculation using 
data from Bankscope 
Too-big-to-fail dummy A dummy variable that takes value 1 if the bank’s share in 
the country’s total deposits exceeds 10% 
Own calculation using 
data from Bankscope 
and World Bank 
database 
Governance index Expressed as a percentage, where satisfying all 52 corporate Own calculation using 
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governance attributes in four broad categories: board of 
directors, audit, anti-takeover, and managerial 
compensation/ownership earns the bank an index of 100%; 
if an attribute is missing then the index represents the 
percentage of non-missing attributes that are satisfied 
data from Institutional 
Shareholder Services 
Private monitoring index Sum of nine dummy variables that measure whether bank 
officials are legally liable for the accuracy of disclosed 
information; whether banks are required to produce 
consolidated financial statements, whether banks disclose 
information such as off-balance sheet items, accrued though 
unpaid interest/principal of non- performing loans and/or 
risk management procedures to the public; whether banks 
must be audited by certified external auditors; whether the 
largest ten banks are rated by international/domestic rating 
agencies; whether there is no explicit deposit insurance 
system and no insurance was paid the last time a bank 
failed; and whether subordinated debt is allowable/required 
as part of capital 
Using World Bank 
database and 
methodology in Barth et 
al. (2004) 
Disclosure-insurance index A sub-index of the Private monitoring index. Sum of eight 
dummy variables that measure whether bank officials are 
legally liable for the accuracy of disclosed information; 
whether banks are required to produce consolidated 
financial statements, whether banks disclose information 
such as off-balance sheet items, accrued though unpaid 
interest/principal of non- performing loans and/or risk 
management procedures to the public; whether banks must 
be audited by certified external auditors; whether the largest 
ten banks are rated by international/domestic rating 
agencies; and whether there is no explicit deposit insurance 
system and no insurance was paid the last time a bank failed 
Using World Bank 
database and 
methodology in Barth et 
al. (2004) 
Supervisory power index Sum of fourteen dummy variables that measure whether the 
supervisory agency has the right to meet with external 
auditors to discuss their report without the approval of the 
Using World Bank 
database and 
methodology in Barth et 
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bank; whether auditors are required by law to communicate 
directly to the supervisory agency any presumed 
involvement of bank directors or senior managers in illicit 
activities, fraud, or insider abuse; whether supervisors can 
take action against external auditors for negligence; whether 
the supervisory authority can force a bank to change its 
internal organization structure; whether off-balance sheet 
items are disclosed to supervisors; whether the supervisory 
agency can order the bank’s directors or management to 
constitute provisions to cover actual or potential losses; 
whether the supervisory agency can suspend the directors’ 
decision to distribute (a) dividends (b) bonuses (c) 
management fees; whether the supervisory agency can 
legally declare – such that this declaration supersedes the 
rights of bank shareholders – that a bank is insolvent; 
whether the banking law gives authority to the supervisory 
agency to intervene, that is, suspend some or all ownership 
rights of a problem bank; regarding bank restructuring and 
reorganization, whether the supervisory agency or any other 
government agency (other than court) can do the following 
(a) supersede shareholder rights (b) remove and replace 
management (c) remove and replace directors 
al. (2004) 
Capital regulation index Sum of eight dummy variables that measure whether the 
minimum capital-asset ratio requirement is risk-weighted in 
line with the Basel guideline; whether the minimum ratio 
varies as a function of market risk; whether market value of 
loan losses not realized in accounting books are deducted; 
whether unrealized losses in securities portfolios are 
deducted; whether unrealized foreign exchange losses are 
deducted; whether the sources of funds to be used as capital 
are verified by the regulatory supervisory agency; whether 
the initial disbursement or subsequent injections of capital 
can be done with assets other than cash or government 
Using World Bank 
database and 
methodology in Barth et 
al. (2004) 
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securities; whether the initial disbursement of capital can be 
done with borrowed funds 
GDP per capita The natural logarithm of gross domestic product World Development 
Indicators 
Financial development The sum of stock market capitalization to GDP and total 
credit to the private sector as a share of GDP 
World Bank database 
Rule of Law index The legal development index Kaufmann et al. (2008) 
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Table II: Summary Statistics 
     
Sample I     
Variable N Mean 
Standard 
deviation Median 
Z-score 4442 3.74 1.13 3.84 
Standard deviation of return, % 4442 0.47 0.90 0.21 
Earnings volatility, % 4426 0.51 0.75 0.27 
Size 4442 14.46 2.03 13.94 
Demand deposits ratio, % 4442 24.34 21.10 17.01 
Loan growth, % 4442 19.76 26.91 13.11 
Loan loss provisions ratio, % 4442 10.31 17.03 6.07 
Liquidity ratio, % 4442 10.08 16.68 4.20 
Independence dummy 4442 0.69 0.46 1.00 
SND/TL, % 4442 1.09 1.46 0.00 
Short-term uninsured debt, % 4442 5.39 6.73 2.78 
Other long-term uninsured debt, % 4442 6.49 7.13 4.11 
Other uninsured debt, % 4442 11.88 9.98 10.09 
State-owned dummy 4442 0.03 0.18 0.00 
Too-big-to-fail dummy 4303 0.13 0.33 0.00 
GDP per capita 327 9.01 1.34 9.10 
Capital regulation index 327 5.13 1.57 5.00 
Supervisory power index 327 11.09 2.26 11.00 
Private monitoring index 327 6.55 1.19 7.00 
Disclosure-insurance index 327 5.57 1.14 6.00 
     
Sample II     
Variable N Mean 
Standard 
deviation Median 
Z-score 2280 3.77 1.11 3.85 
Standard deviation of return, % 2280 0.42 0.72 0.20 
Earnings volatility, % 2271 0.44 0.64 0.25 
Size 2280 14.47 2.24 13.76 
Demand deposits ratio, % 2280 23.49 19.70 16.89 
Loan growth, % 2280 18.35 24.28 12.56 
Loan loss provisions ratio, % 2280 10.10 16.02 5.89 
Liquidity ratio, % 2280 9.40 14.71 4.32 
Independence dummy 2280 0.72 0.45 1.00 
SND/RWA, % 2280 1.45 1.81 0.00 
Short-term uninsured debt, % 1793 6.94 9.53 3.01 
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Other long-term uninsured debt, % 1793 7.81 10.12 3.30 
Other uninsured debt, % 1793 14.75 14.86 10.30 
State-owned dummy 2280 0.03 0.17 0.00 
Too-big-to-fail dummy 2189 0.11 0.31 0.00 
GDP per capita 171 9.48 1.31 9.83 
Capital regulation index 171 5.29 1.51 5.00 
Supervisory power index 171 10.77 2.41 11.00 
Private monitoring index 171 6.76 1.23 7.00 
Disclosure-insurance index 171 5.78 1.17 6.00 
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Table III: Subordinated Debt and Banks' Future Risk Taking 
 
The sample consists of 2,280 banking firm-year observations (Sample II) over the period 2002-2008. Dependent variable is z-score. Regressors are 
lagged by one year. Columns (1) and (4) report OLS estimates. Columns (2), (3), and (5) report 2SLS estimates. The IVs for SND/RWA are the average 
SND ratio of other banks in the same country, year, and size group, the lagged capital-to-assets ratio, and the average tax rate. See Table I for variable 
definition. Also included are the p-value of the regression-based test of endogeneity, the partial R2 of excluded instruments, the p-value of the F-test of 
excluded instruments, and the p-value of the Hansen J test of overidentification. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. For columns (1) and 
(4) t- statistics are reported in parentheses.  For columns (2), (3), and (5), z-statistics are reported. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
      
Dependent variable: z-score OLS  IV  IV OLS IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
SND/RWA -.0735 .2203 .2203 -.0739 .2231 
 (2.65)** (2.52)** (2.52)** (2.69)*** (2.56)** 
Loan growth -.0079 -.0090 -.0090 -.0078 -.0090 
 (3.84)*** (3.20)*** (3.20)*** (3.81)*** (3.18)*** 
Size .0886 -.0020 -.0020 .0880 -.0041 
 (2.06)** (0.13) (0.13) (2.02)** (0.26) 
Demand deposits ratio .0005 .0010 .0010 .0006 .0010 
 (0.15) (0.25) (0.25) (0.18) (0.27) 
Independence dummy .1082 .0470 .0470 .1085 .0495 
 (2.35)** (1.12) (1.12) (2.35)** (1.17) 
Loan loss provisions ratio -.0193 -.0202 -.0202 -.0192 -.0201 
 (3.49)*** (3.10)*** (3.10)*** (3.50)*** (3.11)*** 
Liquidity ratio -.0076 -.0075 -.0075 -.0075 -.0074 
 (1.81)* (1.83)* (1.83)* (1.77)* (1.80)* 
GDP per capita .7531 1.262 1.262 .7714 1.208 
 (2.13)** (4.67)*** (4.67)*** (2.26)** (4.08)*** 
Capital regulation index -.0349 -.0002 -.0002   
 (0.59) (0.00) (0.00)   
Supervisory power index -.0646 -.0576 -.0576   
 (1.60) (1.57) (1.57)   
Private monitoring index -.0236 -.0912    
 (0.53) (1.56)    
Disclosure-insurance index   -.0912   
   (1.56)   
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of clusters 53 53 53 53 53 
Observations 2280 2271 2271 2280 2271 
R-squared 0.31   0.31  
Test of endogeneity (p-value)  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
Partial R2 of instruments  0.0576 0.0576  0.0571 
F-test of instruments (p-value)  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
Hansen J test (p-value)  0.5135 0.5135  0.5142 
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Table IV: Impact of Bank Regulations and Economic Development on the Relation Between Subordinated Debt and 
Banks' Future Risk Taking 
 
The sample consists of 2,280 banking firm-year observations (Sample II) over the period 2002-2008. Dependent variable is z-score. Regressors are 
lagged by one year. In Panels A and C, regressions are estimated using 2SLS, where Columns (1), (3), and (5) report the results for the Low subsamples 
on Disclosure-insurance index (Low DI), Supervisory power index (Low SP), and Economic Development (Low ED), respectively; and Columns (2), 
(4), and (6) report the results for the High subsamples on Disclosure-insurance index (High DI), Supervisory power index (High SP), and Economic 
Development (High ED), respectively. In Panels B and D, regressions are estimated using OLS, where Columns (1), (2), and (3) report the results for 
the Low subsamples on Disclosure-insurance index (Low DI), Supervisory power index (Low SP), and Economic Development (Low ED), respectively. 
The IVs for SND/RWA are the average SND ratio of other banks in the same country, year, and size group, the lagged capital-to-assets ratio, and the 
average tax rate. See Table I for variable definition. Also included are the p-value of the regression-based test of endogeneity, the partial R2 of excluded 
instruments, the p-value of the F-test of excluded instruments, and the p-value of the Hansen J test of overidentification. Standard errors are clustered at 
the country level. For Panels A and C, z- statistics are reported in parentheses.  For Panels B and D, t-statistics are reported. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: IV Estimates 
      
Dependent variable: z-score Low DI High DI Low SP High SP Low ED High ED 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SND/RWA .0166 .2243 -.0673 .2833 .0041 .2954 
 (0.13) (2.93)*** (1.10) (10.57)*** (0.04) (3.63)*** 
Loan growth .0006 -.0118 -.0027 -.0107 .0008 -.0122 
 (0.38) (9.19)*** (1.04) (5.90)*** (0.63) (13.68)*** 
Size -.1822 .0028 -.0839 -.0091 -.0308 -.0227 
 (2.22)** (0.17) (1.87)* (0.83) (0.31) (1.44) 
Demand deposits ratio .0006 .0019 -.0007 .0064 .0059 .0010 
 (0.09) (0.64) (0.23) (3.02)*** (0.80) (0.22) 
Independence dummy -.0703 .0447 -.1178 .1003 -.0290 .0271 
 (0.40) (1.29) (1.21) (2.06)** (0.22) (0.69) 
Loan loss provisions ratio -.0046 -.0220 -.0094 -.0217 -.0103 -.0302 
 (1.04) (3.20)*** (2.87)*** (2.86)*** (3.95)*** (3.85)*** 
Liquidity ratio -.0002 -.0076 .0012 -.0128 -.0046 -.0079 
 (0.03) (1.71)* (0.37) (5.55)*** (0.81) (1.84)* 
GDP per capita .2617 .4524 .7912 .6887 1.496 .4999 
 (0.66) (0.53) (1.55) (1.05) (2.17)** (0.77) 
Capital regulation index -.0111 .0907 .1197 -.0407 -.1491 .126 
 (0.06) (1.22) (1.30) (0.45) (3.18)*** (2.09)** 
Supervisory power index .1411 -.0043 .0148 .0747 .0688 -.1167 
 (1.59) (0.07) (0.36) (0.55) (1.21) (1.61) 
Disclosure-insurance index .2769 -.0174 -.0398 -.2737 -.1144 -.0416 
 (1.20) (0.07) (0.55) (2.87)*** (2.64)** (0.23) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
61 
 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of clusters 25 40 31 28 27 31 
Observations 223 2048 509 1762 305 1966 
Test of endogeneity (p-value) 0.9201 0.0000 0.7980 0.0000 0.9254 0.0000 
Partial R2 of instruments 0.1603 0.0621 0.1646 0.0652 0.1167 0.0605 
F-test of instruments (p-value) 0.0056 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 
Hansen J test (p-value) 0.4362 0.5310 0.3128 0.5467 0.9993 0.5545 
 
 
Panel B: OLS Estimates 
 
Dependent variable: z-score Low DI Low SP Low ED 
 (1) (2) (3) 
SND/RWA .0293 -.0441 .0229 
 (0.57) (1.46) (0.60) 
Loan growth .0005 -.0026 .0010 
 (0.31) (1.00) (0.82) 
Size -.1711 -.0807 -.0225 
 (2.07)** (1.77)* (0.22) 
Demand deposits ratio .0002 -.0007 .0064 
 (0.04) (0.22) (0.90) 
Independence dummy -.1144 -.1301 -.0378 
 (0.72) (1.37) (0.33) 
Loan loss provisions ratio -.0051 -.0105 -.0106 
 (1.17) (3.09)*** (4.22)*** 
Liquidity ratio .0002 .0008 -.0050 
 (0.04) (0.24) (1.02) 
GDP per capita .2699 .8611 1.290 
 (0.69) (1.73)* (1.85)* 
Capital regulation index -.0168 .1096 -.1525 
 (0.09) (1.18) (3.78)*** 
Supervisory power index .1388 .0077 .0632 
 (1.62) (0.19) (1.14) 
Disclosure-insurance index .2664 -.0470 -.1053 
 (1.18) (0.68) (2.69)** 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Number of clusters 26 32 27 
Observations 227 512 310 
R-squared 0.42 0.32 0.34 
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Panel C: IV Estimates 
 
Dependent variable: z-score Low DI High DI Low SP High SP Low ED High ED 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SND/RWA .0120 .2274 -.0618 .2800 -.0069 .2883 
 (0.10) (2.96)*** (1.01) (10.28)*** (0.07) (3.47)*** 
Loan growth .0004 -.0118 -.0027 -.0106 .0011 -.0123 
 (0.28) (9.12)*** (1.07) (5.78)*** (0.94) (13.39)*** 
Size -.1643 .0005 -.0889 -.0079 -.0383 -.0241 
 (2.17)** (0.03) (1.91)* (0.73) (0.38) (1.66)* 
Demand deposits ratio -.0001 .0020 -.0006 .0065 .0054 .0011 
 (0.02) (0.65) (0.21) (3.17)*** (0.74) (0.26) 
Independence dummy -.0758 .0466 -.1082 .1002 -.0140 .0366 
 (0.44) (1.32) (1.09) (2.05)** (0.11) (0.97) 
Loan loss provisions ratio -.0052 -.0218 -.0094 -.0220 -.0106 -.0292 
 (1.30) (3.19)*** (3.03)*** (2.96)*** (4.01)*** (3.63)*** 
Liquidity ratio -.0009 -.0077 .0010 -.0127 -.0065 -.0081 
 (0.19) (1.73)* (0.32) (5.16)*** (1.21) (1.92)* 
GDP per capita .9757 .5198 .9843 .5988 .9915 .0432 
 (2.18)** (0.64) (1.83)* (0.77) (1.53) (0.05) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of clusters 25 40 31 28 27 31 
Observations 223 2048 509 1762 305 1966 
Test of endogeneity (p-value) 0.9018 0.0000 0.8929 0.0000 0.8985 0.0000 
Partial R2 of instruments 0.1608 0.0619 0.1562 0.0656 0.1222 0.0607 
F-test of instruments (p-value) 0.0066 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0005 0.0000 
Hansen J test (p-value) 0.4699 0.5389 0.3338 0.4687 0.9827 0.4930 
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Panel D: OLS Estimates 
    
Dependent variable: z-score Low DI Low SP Low ED 
 (1) (2) (3) 
SND/RWA .0275 -.0466 .0167 
 (0.55) (1.46) (0.43) 
Loan growth .0003 -.0026 .0014 
 (0.23) (1.03) (1.11) 
Size -.1547 -.0849 -.0295 
 (2.04)* (1.80)* (0.28) 
Demand deposits ratio -.0004 -.0006 .0059 
 (0.07) (0.20) (0.83) 
Independence dummy -.1200 -.1155 -.0334 
 (0.78) (1.19) (0.30) 
Loan loss provisions ratio -.0056 -.0104 -.0109 
 (1.45) (3.28)*** (4.21)*** 
Liquidity ratio -.0005 .0006 -.0068 
 (0.13) (0.20) (1.42) 
GDP per capita .9453 1.017 .8427 
 (2.24)** (1.85)* (1.26) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Number of clusters 26 32 27 
Observations 227 512 310 
R-squared 0.41 0.32 0.32 
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Table V: Relation Between Subordinated Debt and Banks' Future Risk Taking - Sample Not Subject to Sample 
Selection 
 
The sample consists of 4,442 banking firm-year observations (Sample I) over the period 2002-2008. Dependent variable is z-score. Regressors are 
lagged by one year. All regressions are estimated using 2SLS, where Columns (1) and (4) report the results for the High subsample on Disclosure-
insurance index (High DI); Columns (2) and (5) report the results for the High subsample on Supervisory power index (High SP); and Columns (3) and 
(6) report the results for the High subsample on Economic development (High ED). The IVs for SND/TL are the average SND ratio of other banks in 
the same country, year, and size group, the lagged capital-to-assets ratio, and the average tax rate. See Table I for variable definition. Also included are 
the p-value of the regression-based test of endogeneity, the partial R2 of excluded instruments, the p-value of the F-test of excluded instruments, and the 
p-value of the Hansen J test of overidentification. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. z- statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
       
Dependent variable: z-score High DI High SP High ED High DI High SP High ED 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SND/TL .3629 .4028 .3588 .3616 .3822 .3505 
 (3.05)*** (2.47)** (3.64)*** (3.14)*** (2.57)** (3.47)*** 
Loan growth -.0063 -.0056 -.0072 -.0062 -.0055 -.0072 
 (3.14)*** (2.40)** (5.15)*** (3.09)*** (2.36)** (5.08)*** 
Size -.0629 -.0874 -.0646 -.0623 -.0808 -.0636 
 (1.76)* (1.42) (2.32)** (1.80)* (1.44) (2.30)** 
Demand deposits ratio .0029 .0044 .0019 .0029 .0044 .0021 
 (1.45) (2.17)** (0.79) (1.45) (2.30)** (0.87) 
Independence dummy .1524 .2134 .1669 .1534 .2146 .1687 
 (2.55)** (4.15)*** (4.10)*** (2.58)*** (4.15)*** (4.18)*** 
Loan loss provisions ratio -.0179 -.0187 -.0239 -.0180 -.0185 -.0235 
 (3.09)*** (3.12)*** (3.54)*** (3.11)*** (3.09)*** (3.40)*** 
Liquidity ratio -.0041 -.0072 -.0027 -.0041 -.0073 -.0028 
 (1.36) (3.35)*** (0.83) (1.37) (3.37)*** (0.86) 
GDP per capita 1.569 1.861 .6742 1.645 1.896 .7725 
 (3.31)*** (3.85)*** (1.07) (3.45)*** (3.90)*** (1.13) 
Capital regulation index -.0092 -.0226 -.0016    
 (0.21) (0.78) (0.02)    
Supervisory power index .0435 .1346 -.1102    
 (0.70) (1.70)* (2.19)**    
Disclosure-insurance index .0989 -.2325 .0604    
 (0.29) (2.18)** (0.46)    
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of clusters 55 46 50 55 46 50 
Observations 3879 3535 3690 3879 3535 3690 
Test of endogeneity (p-value) 0.0000 0.0051 0.0000 0.0000 0.0060 0.0000 
Partial R2 of instruments 0.0281 0.0192 0.0376 0.0284 0.0200 0.0391 
F-test of instruments (p-value) 0.0000 0.0007 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 
Hansen J test (p-value) 0.1369 0.2655 0.4558 0.1534 0.2779 0.4422 
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Table VI: Assessing Sample Selection 
The table reports full information maximum likelihood estimates of the treatment-effects selection model. The sample includes all banks with non-
missing values of z-score and explanatory variables for the period 2002-2008. Dependent variable in the first step is Report. Dependent variable in the 
second step is z-score. Regressors in the second step are lagged by one year. Also included is the p-value of the Wald test of independent equations. See 
Table I for variable definition. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. 
Log pseudolikelihood = -8944.1739 Number of observations   = 5125  
 (Standard. error adjusted for  90 clusters in country) 
 Coefficient Robust SE z p-value 95% Confidence interval 
Z-score       
Loan growth -0.0025 0.0017 -1.47 0.14 -0.0059 0.0008 
Size 0.0425 0.0183 2.32 0.02 0.0066 0.0784 
Demand deposits ratio 0.0017 0.0017 0.97 0.33 -0.0017 0.0051 
Independence dummy 0.1457 0.0526 2.77 0.01 0.0426 0.2488 
Leverage 0.0014 0.0049 0.28 0.78 -0.0082 0.0110 
Loan loss provisions ratio -0.0086 0.0041 -2.11 0.04 -0.0165 -0.0006 
Liquidity ratio -0.0050 0.0031 -1.61 0.11 -0.0110 0.0011 
GDP per capita 1.3250 0.2495 5.31 0.00 0.8360 1.8140 
Report -0.4286 0.4325 -0.99 0.32 -1.2762 0.4190 
Country dummies Yes      
Year dummies Yes      
       
Report       
Accounting standards 1.3384 0.7035 1.90 0.06 -0.0404 2.7173 
Loan growth 0.0023 0.0012 1.92 0.06 0.0000 0.0046 
Size 0.1868 0.0302 6.20 0.00 0.1277 0.2459 
Demand deposits ratio -0.0023 0.0034 -0.67 0.50 -0.0089 0.0044 
Independence dummy -0.1558 0.1929 -0.81 0.42 -0.5338 0.2222 
Leverage -0.0025 0.0092 -0.27 0.78 -0.0206 0.0155 
Loan loss provisions ratio 0.0012 0.0016 0.76 0.45 -0.0019 0.0044 
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Liquidity ratio -0.0041 0.0066 -0.63 0.53 -0.0170 0.0088 
GDP per capita -1.3877 0.6628 -2.09 0.04 -2.6868 -0.0886 
Country dummies Yes      
Year dummies Yes      
       
/athrho 0.2602 0.2787 0.93 0.35 -0.2861 0.8066 
/lnsigma -0.0473 0.0393 -1.20 0.23 -0.1242 0.0296 
       
rho 0.2545 0.2607   -0.2785 0.6677 
sigma 0.9538 0.0374   0.8832 1.0301 
lambda 0.2428 0.2573   -0.2615 0.7471 
       
Wald test of independent equations (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 2.27  Prob. > chi2= 0.1318 
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Table VII: Effect of Subordinated Debt on Bank Risk Taking During the Crisis Period 
 
The table reports the results of estimating cross-section regressions for Sample II (Columns 1-3) and Sample I (Columns 4-6). Dependent variable is z-
score averaged over 2007-2008. Regressors are measured in 2006. All regressions are estimated using 2SLS, where Columns (1) and (4) report the 
results for the High subsamples on Disclosure-insurance index (High DI); Columns (2) and (5) report the results for the High subsamples on 
Supervisory power index (High SP); and Columns (3) and (6) report the results for the High subsamples on Economic development (High ED). The IVs 
for SND/RWA (SND/TL) are the average SND ratio of other banks in the same country, year, and size group, the lagged capital-to-assets ratio, and the 
average tax rate. See Table I for variable definition. Also included are the p-value of the regression-based test of endogeneity, the partial R2 of excluded 
instruments, the p-value of the F-test of excluded instruments, and the p-value of the Hansen J test of overidentification. Standard errors are clustered at 
the country level. z- statistics are reported in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
          
 Sample II Sample I 
Dependent variable: z-score High DI High SP High ED High DI High SP High ED 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SND/RWA (SND/TL) .3163 .3642 .3173 .3266 .2989 .3884 
 (5.85)*** (6.03)*** (5.43)*** (4.69)*** (4.18)*** (4.55)*** 
Loan growth -.0129 -.0103 -.0115 -.0077 -.0061 -.0093 
 (8.14)*** (3.54)*** (5.86)*** (3.14)*** (2.08)** (5.26)*** 
Size -.1037 -.1334 -.1091 -.1106 -.1384 -.1402 
 (3.21)*** (6.75)*** (3.79)*** (3.78)*** (4.57)*** (5.05)*** 
Demand deposits ratio .0125 .0155 .0082 .0084 .0118 .0065 
 (4.61)*** (5.40)*** (1.63) (3.63)*** (5.03)*** (2.24)** 
Independence dummy -.0056 -.0044 -.0246 .0618 .0772 .0580 
 (0.09) (0.07) (0.39) (0.73) (0.91) (1.34) 
Loan loss provisions ratio -.0184 -.0202 -.0323 -.0181 -.0202 -.0282 
 (2.64)*** (2.65)*** (1.70)* (2.45)** (2.75)*** (1.97)** 
Liquidity ratio .0005 -.0032 -.0009 .0016 -.0079 .0020 
 (0.15) (0.98) (0.27) (0.52) (1.84)* (0.60) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of clusters 30 21 24 41 32 37 
Observations 477 394 446 732 637 689 
 
Test of endogeneity (p-value) 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0030 
 
0.0014 
 
0.0000 
Partial R2 of instruments 0.0889 0.0969 0.0848 0.0562 0.0505 0.0832 
 
F-test of instruments (p-value) 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
Hansen J test (p-value) 0.1718 0.2851 0.1030 0.2117 0.1592 0.4085 
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Table VIII: Relation Between Subordinated Debt and Banks' Future Risk Taking – Reduced Sample  
 
The table reports the results for a subset of Sample II, where the number of US banks in the sample is restricted to 181 largest banks in terms of average 
size. Dependent variable is z-score. Regressors are lagged by one year. All regressions are estimated using 2SLS, where Columns (1) and (4) report the 
results for the High subsample on Disclosure-insurance index (High DI); Columns (2) and (5) report the results for the High subsample on Supervisory 
power index (High SP); and Columns (3) and (6) report the results for the High subsample on Economic development (High ED). The IVs for 
SND/RWA are the average SND ratio of other banks in the same country, year, and size group, the lagged capital-to-assets ratio, and the average tax 
rate. See Table I for variable definition. Also included are the p-value of the regression-based test of endogeneity, the partial R2 of excluded 
instruments, the p-value of the F-test of excluded instruments, and the p-value of the Hansen J test of overidentification. Standard errors are clustered at 
the country level. z- statistics are reported in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
       
Dependent variable: z-score High DI High SP High ED High DI High SP High ED 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SND/RWA .2674 .3542 .3379 .2714 .3520 .3443 
 (2.36)** (5.62)*** (2.86)*** (2.39)** (5.74)*** (3.14)*** 
Loan growth -.0034 -.0003 -.0040 -.0035 -.0002 -.0042 
 (1.62) (0.10) (1.76)* (1.63) (0.08) (1.83)* 
Size -.1031 -.1390 -.1337 -.1049 -.1382 -.1400 
 (2.48)** (4.24)*** (3.94)*** (2.55)** (4.19)*** (4.45)*** 
Demand deposits ratio .0026 .0111 .0012 .0026 .0113 .0014 
 (0.68) (2.32)** (0.23) (0.69) (2.48)** (0.27) 
Independence dummy .1093 .3391 .1463 .1090 .3349 .1547 
 (0.86) (4.81)*** (0.99) (0.86) (4.84)*** (1.09) 
Loan loss provisions ratio -.0150 -.0134 -.0222 -.0150 -.0138 -.0213 
 (4.19)*** (3.54)*** (3.09)*** (4.21)*** (3.85)*** (3.01)*** 
Liquidity ratio -.0016 -.0048 -.0018 -.0016 -.0045 -.0018 
 (0.63) (2.81)*** (0.77) (0.63) (2.55)** (0.80) 
GDP per capita 1.551 1.352 1.561 1.755 1.354 1.301 
 (1.88)* (2.36)** (2.17)** (2.26)** (1.88)* (1.64) 
Capital regulation index .0180 .0424 .0696    
 (0.35) (0.43) (0.94)    
Supervisory power index .0132 .0747 -.0806    
 (0.18) (0.64) (1.02)    
Disclosure-insurance index .1470 -.3433 -.0744    
 (0.59) (4.23)*** (0.33)    
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of clusters 40 28 31 40 28 31 
Observations 1019 733 937 1019 733 937 
Test of endogeneity (p-value) 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 
Partial R2 of instruments 0.0856 0.0704 0.0819 0.0802 0.0683 0.0749 
F-test of instruments (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Hansen J test (p-value) 0.8584 0.3277 0.5796 0.9175 0.2766 0.3893 
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Table IX: Relation Between Subordinated Debt and Banks' Future Risk Taking – Weighted Estimation  
 
The sample consists of 2,280 banking firm-year observations (Sample II) over the period 2002-2008. Dependent variable is z-score. Regressors are 
lagged by one year. Each observation is weighted by the inverse of the number of observations from the same country and year. All regressions are 
estimated using 2SLS, where Columns (1) and (4) report the results for the High subsample on Disclosure-insurance index (High DI); Columns (2) and 
(5) report the results for the High subsample on Supervisory power index (High SP); and Columns (3) and (6) report the results for the High subsample 
on Economic development (High ED). The IVs for SND/RWA are the average SND ratio of other banks in the same country, year, and size group, the 
lagged capital-to-assets ratio, and the average tax rate. See Table I for variable definition. Also included are the partial R2 of excluded instruments, the 
p-value of the F-test of excluded instruments, and the p-value of the Hansen J test of overidentification. Standard errors are clustered at the country 
level. z- statistics are reported in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
   
Dependent variable: z-score High DI High SP High ED High DI High SP High ED 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SND/RWA .1254 .3455 .2444 .1068 .2804 .2512 
 (1.59) (2.05)** (1.72)* (1.25) (1.93)* (1.68)* 
Loan growth -.0016 .0038 .0008 -.0021 .0038 .0013 
 (0.56) (1.62) (0.17) (0.72) (1.64) (0.27) 
Size .0027 .0076 -.0950 .0096 .0217 -.0946 
 (0.04) (0.08) (1.54) (0.15) (0.25) (1.55) 
Demand deposits ratio .0020 .0113 -.0002 .0029 .0119 -.0001 
 (0.56) (1.47) (0.06) (0.75) (1.73)* (0.02) 
Independence dummy .1303 .3630 .1499 .1280 .3813 .1497 
 (0.87) (1.64) (0.89) (0.87) (1.94)* (0.88) 
Loan loss provisions ratio -.0108 -.0078 -.0180 -.0113 -.0086 -.0184 
 (3.84)*** (2.26)** (3.92)*** (3.97)*** (3.01)*** (3.78)*** 
Liquidity ratio -.0002 -.0036 -.0012 -.0002 -.0021 -.0017 
 (0.05) (0.56) (0.32) (0.07) (0.36) (0.45) 
GDP per capita 1.394 1.163 .2236 1.191 1.140 .3785 
 (1.90)* (2.05)** (0.27) (1.53) (1.73)* (0.50) 
Capital regulation index -.1442 -.2184 .0203    
 (1.29) (1.32) (0.21)    
Supervisory power index -.0106 -.0040 -.0526    
 (0.16) (0.03) (0.67)    
Disclosure-insurance index .4003 -.2469 .1693    
 (0.91) (1.94)* (1.01)    
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of clusters 40 28 31 40 28 31 
Observations 2048 1762 1966 2048 1762 1966 
Partial R2 of instruments 0.1648 0.1421 0.1573 0.1557 0.1363 0.1581 
F-test of instruments (p-value) 0.0001 0.0022 0.0037 0.0001 0.0038 0.0031 
Hansen J test (p-value) 0.3032 0.2994 0.2421 0.3354 0.2215 0.2831 
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Table X: Alternative Measures of Bank Risk Taking 
 
In Panel A, the sample consists of 2,280 banking firm-year observations (Sample II) over the period 2002-2008. In Panel B, the sample consists of 4,442 
banking firm-year observations (Sample I) over the same period. Dependent variable is standard deviation of return in Columns (1)-(3), and earnings 
volatility in Columns (4)-(6). Regressors are lagged by one year. All regressions are estimated using 2SLS, where Columns (1) and (4) report the results 
for the High subsample on Disclosure-insurance index (High DI); Columns (2) and (5) report the results for the High subsample on Supervisory power 
index (High SP); and Columns (3) and (6) report the results for the High subsample on Economic development (High ED). The IVs for SND/RWA 
(SND/TL) are the average SND ratio of other banks in the same country, year, and size group, the lagged capital-to-assets ratio, and the average tax rate. 
See Table I for variable definition. Also included are the p-value of the regression-based test of endogeneity, the partial R2 of excluded instruments, the 
p-value of the F-test of excluded instruments, and the p-value of the Hansen J test of overidentification. Standard errors are clustered at the country 
level. z- statistics are reported in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Sample II (2,280 banking firm-year observations over the period 2002-2008) 
     
Dependent variable: Standard deviation of return Earnings volatility 
 High DI High SP High ED High DI High SP High ED 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SND/RWA -1.038 -1.173 -1.113 -.9145 -.9898 -.9960 
 (4.80)*** (19.87)*** (5.93)*** (5.58)*** (20.51)*** (7.88)*** 
Loan growth .0142 .0139 .0148 .0137 .0130 .0142 
 (5.31)*** (5.20)*** (7.52)*** (6.24)*** (5.95)*** (8.71)*** 
Size .2770 .3575 .3009 .2355 .2956 .2609 
 (2.54)** (10.95)*** (2.96)*** (2.60)*** (11.94)*** (3.24)*** 
Demand deposits ratio -.0001 -.0042 -.0013 -.0002 -.0037 -.0012 
 (0.03) (1.31) (0.58) (0.09) (1.52) (0.60) 
Independence dummy .0993 .0358 .1031 .1450 .1004 .1355 
 (1.76)* (1.04) (1.73)* (2.47)** (2.61)*** (2.40)** 
Loan loss provisions ratio .0157 .0149 .0239 .0108 .0102 .0197 
 (2.85)*** (2.78)*** (5.14)*** (1.85)* (1.87)* (4.65)*** 
Liquidity ratio .0086 .0130 .0100 .0126 .0207 .0136 
 (1.88)* (3.77)*** (2.45)** (1.90)* (5.63)*** (2.17)** 
GDP per capita -.7124 -1.574 -1.672 -.7324 -1.563 -1.313 
 (0.45) (1.54) (1.20) (0.53) (1.42) (1.06) 
Capital regulation index -.1435 .2142 -.3648 -.1550 .1883 -.3001 
 (0.90) (1.77)* (3.74)*** (1.36) (1.58) (3.54)*** 
Supervisory power index -.0378 .0874 -.0727 -.0730 -.0913 -.0582 
 (0.36) (0.24) (0.56) (0.82) (0.26) (0.53) 
Disclosure-insurance index .2018 .8282 .4485 .2895 .5024 .3528 
 (0.56) (3.41)*** (1.25) (1.03) (2.29)** (1.20) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of clusters 40 28 31 40 28 31 
Observations 2048 1762 1966 2048 1761 1965 
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Test of endogeneity (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Partial R2 of instruments 0.0621 0.0652 0.0605 0.0621 0.0651 0.0604 
F-test of instruments (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Hansen J test (p-value) 0.0253 0.2465 0.1013 0.0228 0.2691 0.1662 
   
 
Panel B: Sample I (4,442 banking firm-year observations over the period 2002-2008) 
       
Dependent variable: Standard deviation of return Earnings volatility 
 High DI High SP High ED High DI High SP High ED 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SND/TL -1.146 -1.398 -.9060 -.9116 -1.013 -.8214 
 (3.30)*** (2.34)** (3.92)*** (4.32)*** (4.06)*** (3.99)*** 
Loan growth .0078 .0071 .0067 .0066 .0058 .0068 
 (3.34)*** (2.66)*** (3.67)*** (3.82)*** (2.77)*** (4.28)*** 
Size .2731 .4000 .1746 .2086 .2808 .1525 
 (2.43)** (2.17)** (1.83)* (2.39)** (3.74)*** (1.70)* 
Demand deposits ratio .0005 .0006 .0008 .0005 .0003 .0013 
 
(0.23) (0.19) (0.35) (0.26) (0.14) (0.63) 
Independence dummy .0330 -.0524 -.0518 .0658 .00433 -.0068 
 (0.27) (0.98) (1.01) (0.70) (0.12) (0.13) 
Loan loss provisions ratio .0163 .0158 .0157 .0113 .0099 .0128 
 (7.00)*** (7.36)*** (4.11)*** (3.84)*** (3.28)*** (3.59)*** 
Liquidity ratio .0005 .0028 -.0017 .0029 .0070 .0024 
 (0.18) (0.75) (0.43) (0.68) (1.39) (0.46) 
GDP per capita -2.008 -2.803 -1.080 -1.395 -1.907 -.6327 
 (2.59)*** (2.81)*** (1.47) (2.53)** (3.20)*** (0.99) 
Capital regulation index .0250 .0584 -.0833 -.0323 -.0143 -.0762 
 (0.49) (1.31) (0.85) (1.01) (0.42) (0.94) 
Supervisory power index -.0868 .0242 .0726 -.0814 -.0494 .0635 
 (0.96) (0.17) (1.28) (1.35) (0.45) (1.16) 
Disclosure-insurance index .0313 .5542 .0151 .0717 .3766 -.0127 
 (0.05) (2.03)** (0.08) (0.15) (2.13)** (0.07) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of clusters 55 46 50 55 46 50 
Observations 3879 3535 3690 3879 3533 3689 
Test of endogeneity (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Partial R2 of instruments 0.0281 0.0192 0.0376 0.0281 0.0197 0.0375 
F-test of instruments (p-value) 0.0000 0.0007 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 0.0000 
Hansen J test (p-value) 0.3737 0.2834 0.2799 0.3785 0.3646 0.2579 
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Table XI: The Impact of Changes in Subordinated Debt on Changes in Bank Risk Taking  
Dependent variable is the change in outcome from t-1 to t, with outcome being z-score in Columns (1)-(3), standard deviation of return in columns (4)-(6), and earnings 
volatility in Columns (7)-(9). The change in SND/RWA is from t-1 to t. Control variables are measured at t-1. All regressions are estimated using 2SLS, where Columns 
(1), (4), and (7) report the results for the High subsample on Disclosure-insurance index (High DI); Columns (2), (5), and (8) - results for the High subsample on 
Supervisory power index (High SP); and Columns (3), (6), and (9) - results for the High subsample on Economic development (High ED). The IVs for the change in 
SND/RWA are the change in average SND ratio of other banks in the same country, year, and size group, the change in lagged equity-to-assets ratio, and the change in 
average tax rate. See Table I for variable definition. Also included are the p-value of the regression-based test of endogeneity, the partial R2 of excluded instruments, the 
p-value of the F-test of excluded instruments, and the p-value of the Hansen J test of overidentification. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. z- statistics are 
reported in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
       
Dependent variable: Change in z-score Change in standard deviation of return Change in earnings volatility 
 High DI High SP High ED High DI High SP High ED High DI High SP High ED 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Change in SND/RWA .3641 -.3861 .6556 -.8902 .0452 -1.256 -.8215 -.1036 -1.125 
 (1.64) (0.82) (6.63)*** (2.89)*** (0.53) (2.90)*** (2.81)*** (1.03) (3.07)*** 
Loan growth .0028 .0025 .0025 -.0030 -.0039 -.0032 -.0030 -.0039 -.0034 
 (4.80)*** (6.57)*** (3.77)*** (2.71)*** (12.59)*** (3.77)*** (2.28)** (7.64)*** (3.91)*** 
Size -.0637 -.0591 -.0686 .0524 .0493 .0523 .0493 .0485 .0487 
 (18.64)*** (14.18)*** (15.58)*** (6.65)*** (40.67)*** (4.10)*** (5.99)*** (31.72)*** (3.95)*** 
Demand deposits ratio .0027 .0029 .0021 -.0017 -.0012 -.0008 -.0016 -.0013 -.0006 
 (3.81)*** (3.61)*** (1.82)* (2.01)** (2.25)** (0.93) (2.16)** (3.98)*** (0.88) 
Independence dummy -.0480 -.0508 -.0392 .0285 .0134 .0055 .0387 .0258 .0148 
 (2.32)** (2.15)** (2.44)** (1.00) (0.77) (0.23) (1.95)* (3.90)*** (0.56) 
Loan loss provisions ratio .0007 .0024 .0028 .0014 .0012 -.0013 .0010 .0011 -.0012 
 (0.33) (1.59) (1.54) (0.52) (1.88)* (0.56) (0.39) (2.43)** (0.71) 
Liquidity ratio .0044 .0057 .0035 -.0027 -.0039 -.0019 -.0017 -.0024 -.0013 
 (2.68)*** (9.95)*** (1.85)* (1.94)* (6.43)*** (1.10) (1.35) (3.25)*** (0.83) 
GDP per capita 1.412 .2261 2.094 -1.541 -.1276 -.7031 -1.504 -.5761 -.2990 
 (2.00)** (0.46) (3.31)*** (1.63) (0.50) (0.81) (1.92)* (2.52)** (0.35) 
Capital regulation index .1572 .1329 .1402 -.1899 .0618 -.2768 -.1152 .0568 -.1736 
 (2.25)** (1.23) (1.48) (4.13)*** (2.39)** (2.83)*** (2.98)*** (2.21)** (1.92)* 
Supervisory power index -.0088 -.1149 -.1183 .0342 .1313 .0373 .0619 -.1246 .0395 
 (0.17) (0.77) (2.87)*** (0.98) (1.99)** (0.72) (1.86)* (1.66)* (0.80) 
Disclosure-insurance index .0432 -.1556 .2509 -.0580 .2331 -.1447 -.0305 -.0656 -.1584 
 (0.27) (1.36) (3.18)*** (0.59) (3.58)*** (0.94) (0.42) (1.24) (1.03) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of clusters 31 24 24 31 24 24 31 24 24 
Observations 1793 1604 1748 1793 1604 1748 1792 1603 1747 
Test of endogeneity (p-value) 0.0823 0.3361 0.0000 0.0000 0.6545 0.0000 0.0000 0.2301 0.0000 
Partial R2 of instruments 0.0054 0.0167 0.0056 0.0054 0.0167 0.0056 0.0043 0.0156 0.0048 
F-test of instruments (p-value) 0.0050 0.0117 0.0010 0.0050 0.0117 0.0010 0.0032 0.0992 0.0015 
Hansen J test (p-value) 0.5096 0.5489 0.4180 0.5197 0.3143 0.5192 0.5244 0.5007 0.5433 
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Table XII: Other Uninsured Debt 
 
Panels A, B, and C report the results for High subsamples on Disclosure-insurance index, on Supervisory power index, and on Economic development, 
respectively. Dependent variable is z-score in Columns (1)-(5), standard deviation of return in Column (6), and earnings volatility in Column (7). 
Regressors are lagged by one year. All regressions are estimated using 2SLS. The IVs for SND/RWA are the average SND ratio of other banks in the 
same country, year, and size group, the lagged capital-to-assets ratio, and the average tax rate. In Columns (5)-(7), the IVs for uninsured debt are the 
lagged capital-to-assets ratio and the average tax rate. See Table I for variable definition. Also included are the p-value of the regression-based test of 
endogeneity, the partial R2 of excluded instruments in the first-stage estimation of SND/RWA, the p-value of the F-test of excluded instruments in the 
first-stage estimation of SND/RWA, and the p-value of the Hansen J test of overidentification. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. z- 
statistics are reported in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: High subsample on Disclosure-insurance index 
       
Dependent variable: Z-score Std. dev. of return Earnings volatility 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
SND/RWA .2587 .2646 .2620 .2617 .6669 -1.430 -1.195 
 (2.65)*** (2.71)*** (2.68)*** (2.68)*** (4.94)*** (6.17)*** (6.71)*** 
ST uninsured debt .0005  .0008     
 (0.21)  (0.32)     
Other LT uninsured debt  -.0031 -.0032     
  (1.33) (1.35)     
Other uninsured debt    -.0012 -.1064 .0860 .0593 
    (0.71) (3.96)*** (2.15)** (1.97)** 
Loan growth -.0130 -.0131 -.0131 -.0130 -.0186 .0185 .0168 
 (7.61)*** (7.56)*** (7.53)*** (7.60)*** (7.94)*** (6.07)*** (6.60)*** 
Size -.0348 -.0318 -.0323 -.0310 .1579 .2019 .1980 
 (1.15) (1.06) (1.05) (1.04) (2.35)** (0.97) (1.21) 
Demand deposits ratio .0023 .0021 .0020 .0022 -.0012 .0016 .0007 
 (0.67) (0.62) (0.60) (0.67) (0.24) (0.28) (0.15) 
Independence dummy -.0515 -.0511 -.0513 -.0492 .0153 .2536 .2964 
 (1.15) (1.13) (1.15) (1.10) (0.20) (2.33)** (3.80)*** 
Loan loss provisions ratio -.0203 -.0203 -.0203 -.0203 -.0220 .0167 .0112 
 (3.07)*** (3.04)*** (3.04)*** (3.05)*** (2.12)** (1.78)* (1.28) 
Liquidity ratio -.0033 -.0033 -.0034 -.0034 -.0042 .0003 .0053 
 (1.27) (1.27) (1.28) (1.26) (0.79) (0.08) (1.23) 
GDP per capita .5953 .6335 .6385 .6020 1.440 -.9855 -.8145 
 (0.67) (0.71) (0.71) (0.68) (0.77) (0.41) (0.43) 
Capital regulation index .0903 .0904 .0894 .0912 .1786 -.2488 -.2357 
 (1.05) (1.06) (1.05) (1.07) (1.68)* (1.29) (1.66)* 
Supervisory power index -.0178 -.0182 -.0186 -.0175 .0107 -.0446 -.0750 
 (0.33) (0.33) (0.34) (0.33) (0.10) (0.29) (0.59) 
Disclosure-insurance index -.2336 -.2322 -.2318 -.2322 -.2042 .3947 .4546 
 (0.93) (0.91) (0.91) (0.92) (0.39) (0.59) (0.93) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of clusters 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 
Observations 1562 1562 1562 1562 1562 1562 1562 
Test of endogeneity (p-value) 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Partial R2 of instruments 0.0624 0.0623 0.0624 0.0624 0.0624 0.0624 0.0624 
F-test of instruments (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Hansen J test (p-value) 0.4220 0.4054 0.4059 0.4189 0.9997 0.9568 0.7624 
 
 
 
Panel B: High subsample on Supervisory power index 
        
Dependent variable: Z-score Std. dev. of return Earnings volatility 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
SND/RWA .3098 .3232 .3164 .3140 .6124 -1.496 -1.216 
 (10.18)*** (10.25)*** (10.30)*** (10.48)*** (13.00)*** (18.93)*** (18.07)*** 
ST uninsured debt .0003  .0008     
 (0.26)  (0.59)     
Other LT uninsured debt  -.0039 -.0039     
  (2.09)** (2.12)**     
Other uninsured debt    -.0016 -.0917 .0695 .0469 
    (1.45) (9.76)*** (3.23)*** (2.84)*** 
Loan growth -.0119 -.0121 -.0121 -.0120 -.0162 .0170 .0154 
 (5.28)*** (5.31)*** (5.33)*** (5.32)*** (5.65)*** (5.26)*** (5.71)*** 
Size -.0499 -.0504 -.0492 -.0455 .1324 .3361 .2973 
 (3.23)*** (3.37)*** (3.09)*** (2.94)*** (4.58)*** (3.79)*** (4.64)*** 
Demand deposits ratio .0077 .0072 .0072 .0074 -.0060 .0032 .0009 
 (2.95)*** (2.69)*** (2.68)*** (2.77)*** (1.38) (0.59) (0.21) 
Independence dummy .0013 -.0009 .0009 .0026 .0319 .2670 .3013 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.44) (4.38)*** (7.92)*** 
Loan loss provisions ratio -.0197 -.0198 -.0198 -.0197 -.0213 .0159 .0108 
 (2.64)*** (2.60)*** (2.61)*** (2.62)*** (1.92)* (1.71)* (1.27) 
Liquidity ratio -.0064 -.0064 -.0064 -.0065 -.0100 .0010 .0104 
 (4.53)*** (4.76)*** (4.76)*** (4.59)*** (3.84)*** (0.26) (4.25)*** 
GDP per capita .9332 .9695 .9656 .9401 1.458 -1.937 -1.819 
 (1.77)* (1.83)* (1.84)* (1.78)* (1.84)* (1.78)* (1.60) 
Capital regulation index -.1287 -.1310 -.1304 -.1288 -.1518 .3493 .2795 
 (1.90)* (1.90)* (1.90)* (1.87)* (1.20) (2.59)*** (2.26)** 
Supervisory power index .0786 .0800 .0784 .0807 .1861 -.0311 -.1898 
 (0.69) (0.68) (0.67) (0.70) (0.66) (0.06) (0.40) 
Disclosure-insurance index -.2699 -.2702 -.2673 -.2691 -.2576 .7976 .4872 
 (2.72)*** (2.68)*** (2.65)*** (2.71)*** (1.38) (2.11)** (1.52) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of clusters 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 
Observations 1277 1277 1277 1277 1277 1277 1276 
Test of endogeneity (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Partial R2 of instruments 0.0655 0.0638 0.0652 0.0648 0.0641 0.0641 0.0640 
F-test of instruments (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Hansen J test (p-value) 0.5837 0.5986 0.5975 0.5859 0.4679 0.6128 0.6464 
 
 
 
Panel C: High subsample on Economic development 
       
Dependent variable: Z-score Std. dev. of return Earnings volatility 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
SND/RWA .3317 .3312 .3332 .3332 .5974 -1.333 -1.152 
 (3.29)*** (3.10)*** (3.24)*** (3.22)*** (5.31)*** (5.12)*** (6.42)*** 
ST uninsured debt -.0024  -.0021     
 (0.61)  (0.52)     
Other LT uninsured debt  -.0029 -.0027     
  (1.03) (0.96)     
Other uninsured debt    -.0024 -.0814 .0424 .0275 
    (1.15) (9.34)*** (3.01)*** (2.57)** 
Loan growth -.0134 -.0135 -.0135 -.0135 -.0178 .01664 .0154 
 (12.50)*** (12.10)*** (12.38)*** (12.71)*** (11.81)*** (6.27)*** (7.12)*** 
Size -.0600 -.0605 -.0572 -.0570 .1228 .2955 .2772 
 (1.98)** (2.26)** (1.94)* (2.03)** (3.18)*** (2.17)** (2.57)** 
Demand deposits ratio .0015 .0011 .0012 .0013 -.0009 -.0016 -.0017 
 (0.33) (0.24) (0.28) (0.27) (0.27) (0.49) (0.67) 
Independence dummy -.0847 -.0867 -.0840 -.0836 .0034 .2918 .3178 
 (1.95)* (1.98)** (1.94)* (1.96)** (0.06) (4.71)*** (6.09)*** 
Loan loss provisions ratio -.0293 -.0293 -.0293 -.0293 -.0319 .0274 .0228 
 (2.96)*** (2.92)*** (2.93)*** (2.93)*** (2.31)** (2.67)*** (2.56)** 
Liquidity ratio -.0032 -.0032 -.0032 -.0032 -.0059 .0018 .0060 
 (1.40) (1.41) (1.41) (1.41) (1.50) (0.52) (2.04)** 
GDP per capita .2067 .2182 .2198 .2186 .7890 -1.083 -.6780 
 (0.34) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.75) (0.75) (0.55) 
Capital regulation index .1730 .1705 .1726 .1729 .2942 -.5309 -.4294 
 (2.61)*** (2.53)** (2.65)*** (2.59)*** (3.37)*** (3.62)*** (3.70)*** 
Supervisory power index -.1150 -.1144 -.1143 -.1143 -.0707 -.1036 -.0813 
 (1.63) (1.61) (1.62) (1.62) (0.75) (0.73) (0.70) 
Disclosure-insurance index -.0658 -.0596 -.0633 -.0641 -.2006 .5565 .4354 
 (0.40) (0.36) (0.38) (0.38) (0.79) (1.49) (1.47) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Number of clusters 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 
Observations 1480 1480 1480 1480 1480 1480 1479 
Test of endogeneity (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Partial R2 of instruments 0.0604 0.0605 0.0604 0.0604 0.0605 0.0605 0.0603 
F-test of instruments (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Hansen J test (p-value) 0.4608 0.4301 0.4390 0.4485 0.6647 0.9094 0.9623 
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Table XIII: Bank-level Corporate Governance 
 
The table reports the results for a subset of US banks that have bank-level corporate governance data available, and Columns (7) – (9) of Panel B report 
the results for the whole US sample. Dependent variable is z-score in Columns (1), (4) and Panel B - Column (7), standard deviation of return in 
Columns (2), (5) and Panel B - Column (8), and earnings volatility in Columns (3), (6) and Panel B - Column (9). Regressors are lagged by one year. All 
regressions are estimated using 2SLS. The IVs for SND/RWA are the average SND ratio of other banks in the same country, year, and size group, the 
lagged capital-to-assets ratio, and the average tax rate. The governance index is expressed as a percentage, where satisfying all 52 corporate governance 
attributes earns a firm an index of 100%. See Table I for variable definition. Also included are the p-value of the regression-based test of endogeneity, 
the partial R2 of excluded instruments in the first-stage estimation of SND/RWA, the p-value of the F-test of excluded instruments in the first-stage 
estimation of SND/RWA, and the p-value of the Hansen J test of overidentification. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. z- statistics are 
reported in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Without Firm fixed effects   
     
Dependent variable: Z-score Standard deviation 
of return 
Earnings volatility Z-score Standard deviation 
of return 
Earnings volatility 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SND/RWA -.1736 -.2343 -.2585 -.1841 -.2274 -.2524 
 (1.69)* (2.37)** (2.21)** (1.81)* (2.51)** (2.35)** 
Loan growth .0006 .0033 .0039 .0007 .0033 .0039 
 (0.23) (1.82)* (1.91)* (0.24) (1.91)* (2.01)** 
Size .0621 .0717 .0797 .0766 .0567 .0642 
 (1.41) (1.76)* (1.68)* (1.74)* (1.61) (1.59) 
Demand deposits ratio .0075 -.0017 -.0027 .0087 -.0031 -.0042 
 (1.43) (0.58) (0.87) (1.66)* (1.04) (1.27) 
Independence dummy -.1197 -.0292 -.0646 -.1270 -.0224 -.0577 
 (0.69) (0.24) (0.49) (0.72) (0.18) (0.44) 
Loan loss provisions ratio -.0268 .0132 .0087 -.0262 .0126 .0081 
 (5.19)*** (4.61)*** (2.69)*** (5.15)*** (4.71)*** (2.70)*** 
Liquidity ratio -.0093 .0154 .0229 -.0091 .0151 .0225 
 (4.43)*** (4.64)*** (5.41)*** (4.20)*** (4.92)*** (5.68)*** 
Governance index    -.0054 .0063 .0067 
    (0.95) (1.82)* (1.66)* 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of clusters 297 297 297 297 297 297 
Observations 779 779 779 779 779 779 
Test of endogeneity(p-value) 0.6246 0.0000 0.0000 0.5280 0.0000 0.0000 
Partial R2 of instruments 0.0837 0.0837 0.0837 0.0871 0.0871 0.0871 
F-test of instruments (p-value) 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Hansen J test (p-value) 0.2677 0.2058 0.1397 0.2569 0.1938 0.1291 
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Panel B: With Firm fixed effects 
 
 
Dependent variable Z-score Standard 
deviation of 
return 
Earnings 
volatility 
Z-score Standard 
deviation of 
return 
Earnings 
volatility 
Z-score Standard 
deviation of 
return 
Earnings 
volatility 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
SND/RWA -.0031 -.0739 -.2057 .0132 -.0752 -.2070 1.400 -1.727 -1.659 
 (0.01) (0.27) (0.66) (0.02) (0.28) (0.67) (2.11)** (1.80)* (2.33)** 
Loan growth .0042 -.0013 -.0005 .0042 -.0013 -.0005 -.0053 .0079 .0080 
 (1.59) (1.01) (0.37) (1.60) (1.01) (0.37) (3.07)*** (4.06)*** (4.07)*** 
Size -.9780 .3213 .1807 -.9864 .3222 .1821 .9614 -1.321 -1.164 
 (2.07)** (1.47) (0.76) (2.08)** (1.46) (0.76) (3.36)*** (3.07)*** (4.06)*** 
Demand deposits ratio -.0001 -.0041 -.0057 -.0002 -.0041 -.0057 .0012 .0025 .0007 
 (0.01) (1.38) (1.70)* (0.02) (1.37) (1.70)* (0.12) (0.27) (0.08) 
Loan loss provisions ratio -.0081 .0051 .0043 -.0084 .0052 .0043 -.0232 .0154 .0134 
 (1.14) (1.44) (1.12) (1.17) (1.46) (1.12) (5.45)*** (3.48)*** (3.59)*** 
Liquidity ratio -.0263 .0088 .0198 -.0266 .0088 .0198 -.0168 .0080 .0141 
 (1.09) (0.75) (1.44) (1.09) (0.75) (1.44) (1.41) (0.83) (1.53) 
Governance index    .0109 -.0011 -.0015    
    (0.69) (0.17) (0.24)    
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of clusters 297 297 297 297 297 297 483 483 483 
Observations 779 779 779 779 779 779 1546 1546 1546 
Test of endogeneity (p-value) 0.6638 0.5031 0.4091 0.6477 0.4997 0.4070 0.0085 0.0393 0.0054 
Partial R2 of instruments 0.0246 0.0246 0.0246 0.0241 0.0241 0.0241 0.0135 0.0135 0.0135 
F-test of instruments (p-value) 0.0502 0.0502 0.0502 0.0526 0.0526 0.0526 0.0046 0.0046 0.0046 
Hansen J test (p-value) 0.0960 0.0992 0.2632 0.1075 0.1002 0.2633 0.0185 0.3059 0.4816 
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Table XIV: When Subordinated Debt Is Not Expected to Exert Market Discipline Effects 
 
Panel A examines the effect of subordinated debt in state-owned banks and Panels B-D examine the effect of subordinated debt in too-big-to-fail banks 
by including a dummy variable for the type of banking firms in question and an interaction term between the SND ratio and the corresponding dummy. 
Dependent variable is z-score in Columns (1)-(3), standard deviation of return in Columns (4)-(6), and earnings volatility in Columns (7)-(9). Regressors 
are lagged by one year. All regressions are estimated using 2SLS, where Columns (1), (4) and (7) report the results for the High subsample on 
Disclosure-insurance index (High DI); Columns (2), (5) and (8) report the results for the High subsample on Supervisory power index (High SP); and 
Columns (3), (6) and (9) report the results for the High subsample on Economic development (High ED). The IVs for SND/RWA are the average SND 
ratio of other banks in the same country, year, and size group, the lagged capital-to-assets ratio, and the average tax rate. The IVs for the interaction term 
between the SND ratio and the state-owned/too-big-to-fail dummy are the interaction terms between the state-owned/too-big-to-fail dummy and each of 
the three variables: the average SND ratio of other banks in the same country, year and size group, the bank’s lagged capital-to-assets ratio, and the 
bank’s average tax rate. See Table I for variable definition. Also included are the p-value of the regression-based test of endogeneity, the partial R2 of 
excluded instruments in the first-stage estimation of SND/RWA, the p-value of the F-test of excluded instruments in the first-stage estimation of 
SND/RWA, and the p-value of the Hansen J test of overidentification. Also reported at the bottom of each panel is the p-value of the test of the null 
hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients on the SND ratio and on the interaction term between the SND ratio and the corresponding dummy is zero. 
Standard errors are clustered at the country level. z-statistics are reported in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: State-owned banking firms 
 
            
Dependent variable: Z-score Standard deviation of return Earnings volatility 
 
High DI High SP High ED High DI High SP High ED High DI High SP High ED 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
SND/RWA .2685 .2967 .3139 -1.099 -1.162 -1.138 -.9665 -.9903 -1.016 
 (4.83)*** (8.19)*** (4.35)*** (6.70)*** (21.33)*** (6.78)*** (8.28)*** (26.20)*** (9.33)*** 
SND/RWA*State dummy -.5681 -1.012 -.3338 .9143 1.098 .8177 .7964 1.157 .7398 
 (2.81)*** (1.93)* (2.38)** (5.98)*** (3.10)*** (4.07)*** (5.98)*** (3.76)*** (4.00)*** 
State dummy 1.302 1.453 .7455 -2.788 -2.506 -2.919 -2.376 -2.361 -2.626 
 (3.09)*** (1.10) (1.29) (8.05)*** (3.53)*** (4.86)*** (8.90)*** (3.44)*** (5.23)*** 
Loan growth -.0122 -.0106 -.0125 .0150 .0137 .0153 .0144 .0129 .0147 
 (11.69)*** (5.59)*** (15.14)*** (7.14)*** (4.99)*** (9.22)*** (8.29)*** (5.96)*** (11.01)*** 
Size -.0081 -.0123 -.0282 .2951 .3538 .3113 .2508 .2958 .2698 
 (0.59) (0.73) (1.80)* (3.09)*** (10.09)*** (3.30)*** (3.17)*** (12.48)*** (3.66)*** 
Demand deposits ratio .0016 .0066 .0009 .0002 -.0042 -.0018 .0000 -.0037 -.0017 
 (0.51) (3.09)*** (0.21) (0.06) (1.33) (0.79) (0.01) (1.56) (0.85) 
Independence dummy .0275 .1296 .0260 .1227 -.0042 .0984 .1654 .0658 .1347 
 (0.61) (1.85)* (0.65) (1.69)* (0.12) (1.55) (2.27)** (3.68)*** (2.21)** 
80 
 
Loan loss provisions ratio -.0232 -.0240 -.0305 .0168 .0169 .0239 .0118 .0125 .0197 
 (3.49)*** (3.16)*** (3.97)*** (3.35)*** (3.60)*** (5.26)*** (2.21)** (2.85)*** (4.77)*** 
Liquidity ratio -.0081 -.0128 -.0081 .0095 .0136 .0105 .0134 .0212 .0141 
 (1.89)* (5.46)*** (1.91)* (2.23)** (4.71)*** (2.64)*** (2.12)** (6.74)*** (2.31)** 
GDP per capita .8274 .7302 .6785 -1.349 -1.605 -2.074 -1.283 -1.634 -1.591 
 (0.96) (1.27) (1.03) (0.87) (1.77)* (1.64) (0.96) (1.69)* (1.44) 
Capital regulation index .0933 .0191 .1232 -.1439 .1558 -.3649 -.1553 .0949 -.2949 
 (1.48) (0.21) (2.23)** (1.07) (1.34) (4.05)*** (1.66)* (0.84) (3.62)*** 
Supervisory power index -.0305 .0883 -.1260 .0080 .1028 -.0393 -.0332 -.1244 -.0466 
 (0.52) (0.58) (1.85)* (0.08) (0.35) (0.39) (0.39) (0.44) (0.49) 
Disclosure-insurance index .0886 -.0492 -.0225 -.0370 .5566 .3794 .0864 .2525 .3348 
 (0.31) (0.29) (0.14) (0.09) (2.42)** (1.34) (0.27) (1.26) (1.35) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of clusters 40 28 31 40 28 31 40 28 31 
Observations 2048 1762 1966 2048 1762 1966 2048 1761 1965 
Test of endogeneity (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Partial R2 of instruments 0.0654 0.0678 0.0649 0.0654 0.0678 0.0640 0.0654 0.0676 0.0638 
F-test of instruments (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Hansen J test (p-value) 0.7921 0.7034 0.5642 0.0580 0.3756 0.1089 0.0424 0.4799 0.2069 
(Row1 + Row2) = 0 (p-value) 0.0948 0.1814 0.8750 0.2304 0.8650 0.0215 0.1759 0.6017 0.0486 
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Panel B: Too-big-to-fail banking firms (The bank’s share in the country’s total deposits exceeds 10%) 
 
 
Dependent variable: Z-score Standard deviation of return Earnings volatility 
 
High DI High SP High ED High DI High SP High ED High DI High SP High ED 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
SND/RWA .2660 .3477 .3148 -.9412 -1.034 -.9779 -.8105 -.8569 -.8723 
 (4.27)*** (6.84)*** (4.94)*** (4.24)*** (11.59)*** (4.96)*** (4.43)*** (10.84)*** (5.99)*** 
SND/RWA*TBTF dummy -.2269 -.0032 -.4262 .1553 .3017 1.413 .0830 .2729 1.267 
 (2.26)** (0.01) (1.81)* (0.79) (1.07) (5.01)*** (0.48) (1.95)* (5.71)*** 
TBTF dummy .6991 .2971 1.413 -.9915 -1.633 -5.962 -.6583 -1.261 -5.395 
 (2.14)** (0.39) (1.59) (1.68)* (1.93)* (4.76)*** (1.38) (2.78)*** (5.42)*** 
Loan growth -.0120 -.0119 -.0124 .0141 .0142 .0146 .0136 .0134 .0141 
 (10.55)*** (11.19)*** (16.77)*** (5.89)*** (7.30)*** (8.94)*** (6.89)*** (8.93)*** (11.09)*** 
Size -.0051 -.0350 -.0203 .2628 .3245 .2723 .2160 .2616 .2357 
 (0.28) (1.55) (1.20) (2.63)*** (9.34)*** (2.97)*** (2.45)** (8.13)*** (3.13)*** 
Demand deposits ratio .0024 .0078 .0011 .0001 -.0052 .0003 -.0000 -.0046 .0002 
 (0.85) (3.57)*** (0.26) (0.05) (2.17)** (0.11) (0.02) (2.81)*** (0.09) 
Independence dummy .0233 .0619 .0093 .0666 -.0271 .0775 .1145 .0460 .1193 
 (0.61) (2.64)*** (0.24) (1.40) (0.57) (1.70)* (2.45)** (1.93)* (2.71)*** 
Loan loss provisions ratio -.0241 -.0247 -.0357 .0156 .0156 .0248 .0105 .0108 .0209 
 (3.26)*** (2.93)*** (6.67)*** (2.70)*** (2.79)*** (5.87)*** (1.67)* (1.85)* (5.66)*** 
Liquidity ratio -.0074 -.0144 -.0068 .0093 .0149 .0083 .0134 .0225 .0122 
 (1.59) (9.57)*** (1.51) (2.06)** (7.14)*** (1.77)* (1.99)** (8.82)*** (1.76)* 
GDP per capita .8248 -1.745 .6067 -2.388 .3330 -1.720 -2.416 -.1443 -1.305 
 (0.83) (1.09) (0.91) (1.50) (0.17) (1.27) (1.92)* (0.09) (1.15) 
Capital regulation index .1575 1.137 .1897 -.2016 -.9905 -.3815 -.2000 -.9937 -.3118 
 (2.77)*** (5.03)*** (4.27)*** (1.29) (3.01)*** (3.08)*** (1.83)* (3.49)*** (2.87)*** 
Supervisory power index -.0401 .0898 -.1734 .0749 .2286 .0657 .0351 .0287 .0443 
 (0.53) (1.11) (3.52)*** (1.11) (2.25)** (0.85) (0.73) (0.32) (0.63) 
Disclosure-insurance index .1428 -.3484 .1171 -.0531 .7174 -.0051 .0972 .4799 .0039 
 (0.53) (1.96)** (1.05) (0.14) (4.55)*** (0.02) (0.37) (5.90)*** (0.02) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of clusters 37 24 27 37 24 27 37 24 27 
Observations 2003 1711 1941 2003 1711 1941 2003 1710 1940 
Test of endogeneity (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Partial R2 of instruments 0.0737 0.0857 0.0837 0.0737 0.0857 0.0837 0.0737 0.0856 0.0836 
F-test of instruments (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Hansen J test (p-value) 0.7895 0.3118 0.7123 0.0429 0.1608 0.3043 0.0308 0.0812 0.3187 
(Row1 + Row2) = 0 (p-value) 0.7732 0.1053 0.6369 0.0168 0.0176 0.1352 0.0136 0.0002 0.1225 
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Panel C: Too-big-to-fail banking firms (The bank’s share in the country’s total deposits exceeds 15%) 
 
 
Dependent variable: Z-score Standard deviation of return Earnings volatility 
 
High DI High SP High ED High DI High SP High ED High DI High SP High ED 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
SND/RWA .2638 .3639 .3307 -.9937 -1.128 -1.059 -.8696 -.9514 -.9412 
 (3.85)*** (6.79)*** (5.20)*** (4.63)*** (26.61)*** (5.88)*** (5.31)*** (24.70)*** (7.64)*** 
SND/RWA * TBTF dummy -.1701 -.3052 -.3939 .3386 .9490 1.074 .2793 .8075 .9048 
 (0.88) (1.56) (1.68)* (1.04) (4.54)*** (4.06)*** (0.96) (6.68)*** (4.07)*** 
Loan growth -.0120 -.0111 -.0127 .0140 .0137 .0151 .0135 .0129 .0145 
 (9.79)*** (6.66)*** (18.61)*** (5.33)*** (5.60)*** (10.15)*** (6.29)*** (6.55)*** (12.28)*** 
Size -.0087 -.0401 -.0388 .2659 .3497 .2932 .2233 .2888 .2531 
 (0.45) (1.76)* (2.00)** (2.50)** (16.90)*** (3.20)*** (2.49)** (17.16)*** (3.48)*** 
Demand deposits ratio .0021 .0072 .0011 -.0002 -.0051 -.0011 -.0003 -.0045 -.0011 
 (0.68) (3.34)*** (0.24) (0.08) (1.74)* (0.55) (0.14) (2.00)** (0.60) 
Independence dummy .0462 .1107 .0289 .0696 -.0455 .0657 .1184 .0339 .1064 
 (1.25) (1.70)* (0.72) (1.35) (0.72) (1.46) (2.40)** (0.96) (2.52)** 
Loan loss provisions ratio -.0222 -.0219 -.0301 .0154 .0143 .0218 .0105 .0098 .0179 
 (3.21)*** (2.84)*** (3.80)*** (2.85)*** (2.81)*** (3.90)*** (1.82)* (1.85)* (3.47)*** 
Liquidity ratio -.0073 -.0126 -.0075 .0081 .0118 .0087 .0122 .0197 .0127 
 (1.64) (4.95)*** (1.72)* (1.73)* (3.07)*** (1.99)** (1.79)* (4.72)*** (1.89)* 
TBTF dummy .5392 .9934 1.695 -1.340 -3.202 -4.779 -1.089 -2.666 -4.100 
 (0.81) (1.52) (1.76)* (1.14) (4.39)*** (4.09)*** (1.04) (5.12)*** (4.16)*** 
GDP per capita .5751 .8001 .6652 -.8872 -1.536 -1.841 -.8732 -1.551 -1.360 
 (0.66) (1.14) (0.94) (0.60) (1.77)* (1.48) (0.68) (1.62) (1.24) 
Capital regulation index .1050 .0149 .1462 -.1435 .0313 -.3588 -.1535 .0157 -.2848 
 (1.50) (0.15) (2.65)*** (0.97) (0.28) (3.66)*** (1.50) (0.15) (3.35)*** 
Supervisory index -.0190 .0103 -.1585 .0032 .3215 .0635 -.0381 .0847 .0424 
 (0.31) (0.07) (2.40)** (0.04) (2.01)** (1.14) (0.51) (0.45) (0.74) 
Disclosure-insurance index .0560 -.1454 .0704 .0170 .2832 .0677 .1363 .0534 .0669 
 (0.22) (0.88) (0.41) (0.05) (1.79)* (0.32) (0.47) (0.58) (0.35) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of clusters 40 28 31 40 28 31 40 28 31 
Observations 2048 1762 1966 2048 1762 1966 2048 1761 1965 
Test of endogeneity(p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Partial R2 of instruments 0.0690 0.0734 0.0670 0.0690 0.0734 0.0670 0.0690 0.0733 0.0670 
F-test of instruments (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Hansen J test (p-value) 0.6259 0.2084 0.7736 0.0741 0.1829 0.2077 0.0572 0.1283 0.2099 
Row1 + Row2 = 0 (p-value) 0.6186 0.7426 0.8025 0.0733 0.3929 0.9504 0.0745 0.1668 0.8715 
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Panel D: Too-big-to-fail banking firms (The bank’s share in the country’s total deposits exceeds 20%) 
 
 
Dependent variable: Z-score Standard deviation of return Earnings volatility 
 
High DI High SP High ED High DI High SP High ED High DI High SP High ED 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
SND/RWA .2596 .3674 .3235 -.9946 -1.156 -1.070 -.8676 -.9699 -.9529 
 (3.77)*** (6.29)*** (4.97)*** (4.61)*** (25.33)*** (6.04)*** (5.22)*** (23.49)*** (7.98)*** 
SND/RWA * TBTF dummy -.3403 -.3368 -.3613 .5497 1.173 1.056 .3440 .9526 .8918 
 (1.57) (2.00)** (1.58) (1.32) (7.47)*** (4.08)*** (0.87) (8.60)*** (3.93)*** 
Loan growth -.0120 -.0111 -.0126 .0140 .0139 .0151 .0135 .0130 .0145 
 (9.97)*** (6.72)*** (18.01)*** (5.35)*** (5.77)*** (9.90)*** (6.27)*** (6.69)*** (12.06)*** 
Size -.0084 -.0404 -.0345 .2670 .3585 .2973 .2228 .2933 .2574 
 (0.43) (1.73)* (1.90)* (2.52)** (18.82)*** (3.28)*** (2.46)** (18.89)*** (3.61)*** 
Demand deposits ratio .0022 .0073 .0010 -.0003 -.0055 -.0011 -.0003 -.0047 -.0011 
 (0.70) (3.31)*** (0.23) (0.12) (1.81)* (0.54) (0.15) (2.05)** (0.58) 
Independence dummy .0590 .1103 .0302 .0534 -.0498 .0703 .1116 .0326 .1110 
 (1.57) (1.72)* (0.75) (0.98) (0.75) (1.59) (2.17)** (0.91) (2.68)*** 
Loan loss provisions ratio -.0222 -.0218 -.0299 .0155 .0142 .0218 .0106 .0096 .0179 
 (3.23)*** (2.83)*** (3.78)*** (2.89)*** (2.74)*** (3.93)*** (1.84)* (1.81)* (3.50)*** 
Liquidity ratio -.0072 -.0128 -.0077 .0081 .0126 .0093 .0123 .0204 .0132 
 (1.62) (5.76)*** (1.80)* (1.75)* (4.14)*** (2.19)** (1.82)* (5.88)*** (2.02)** 
TBTF dummy 1.233 1.077 1.627 -2.215 -4.036 -4.905 -1.379 -3.132 -4.234 
 (1.58) (1.93)* (1.70)* (1.36) (6.42)*** (4.26)*** (0.92) (5.37)*** (4.28)*** 
GDP per capita .7270 .8293 .6806 -1.119 -1.675 -1.996 -.9768 -1.653 -1.501 
 (0.88) (1.17) (0.99) (0.75) (1.97)** (1.57) (0.76) (1.77)* (1.35) 
Capital regulation index .1123 .0192 .1408 -.1577 -.0036 -.3610 -.1599 -.0089 -.2867 
 (1.65)* (0.20) (2.52)** (1.07) (0.03) (3.69)*** (1.54) (0.08) (3.36)*** 
Supervisory index -.0332 .0078 -.1586 .0171 .3458 .0674 -.0364 .0979 .0468 
 (0.53) (0.05) (2.47)** (0.22) (2.28)** (1.17) (0.49) (0.54) (0.80) 
Disclosure-insurance index .0909 -.1289 .0557 .0051 .1602 .1098 .1625 -.0209 .1030 
 (0.35) (0.91) (0.35) (0.01) (1.24) (0.50) (0.55) (0.23) (0.52) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of clusters 40 28 31 40 28 31 40 28 31 
Observations 2048 1762 1966 2048 1762 1966 2048 1761 1965 
Test of endogeneity(p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Partial R2 of instruments 0.0689 0.0728 0.0661 0.0689 0.0728 0.0661 0.0689 0.0728 0.0661 
F-test of instruments (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Hansen J test (p-value) 0.6128 0.1498 0.5730 0.2112 0.7820 0.1699 0.1181 0.6528 0.1687 
Row1 + Row2 = 0 (p-value) 0.6727 0.8375 0.8656 0.2885 0.9203 0.9531 0.2029 0.8609 0.7957 
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Table XV: Impact on Risk Taking for Banking Firms That First Issue Subordinated Debt 
The table reports bias-corrected nearest neighbor matching estimates of the average effect on risk taking for banking firms that first have raw 
subordinated debt changed from zero to positive during the period 2003-2007. The control group for a particular year includes banking firms that have 
not had subordinated debt on their balance sheets up to that year. Panel A shows estimates of the average treatment effect on treated banks one year after 
the treatment. Panel B reports estimates of the average treatment effect on treated banks one year before the treatment. Treated and control banks are 
matched by country,  year, bank size, demand deposits ratio, loan growth, loan loss provisions ratio, liquidity ratio, independence dummy, capital-to-
assets ratio and average tax rate in the year before the treatment (Panel A), and two years before the treatment (Panel B). Columns (1), (4), and (7) report 
the results for the High subsample on Disclosure-insurance index (High DI); Columns (2), (5), and (8) report the results for the High subsample on 
Supervisory power index (High SP); and Columns (3), (6), and (9) report the results for the High subsample on Economic development (High ED). The 
outcome variable is z-score in Columns (1)-(3), standard deviation of return in Columns (4)-(6), and earnings volatility in Columns (7)-(8). z- statistics 
are reported in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: One year after the treatment 
 
 Outcome variable: Z-score Standard deviation of return Earnings volatility 
Number of matching banks High DI High SP High ED High DI High SP High ED High DI High SP High ED 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
1 0.2788 0.2758 0.2990 -0.1300 -0.1121 -0.1441 -0.0879 -0.0121 -0.0849 
 (2.09)** (1.86)* (2.26)** (3.03)*** (2.45)** (3.54)*** (1.81)* (0.19) (1.99)** 
          
2 0.2133 0.1581 0.2143 -0.1023 -0.0747 -0.1096 -0.0564 -0.0143 -0.0656 
 (1.86)* (1.27) (1.86)* (2.90)*** (1.99)** (3.23)*** (1.44) (0.28) (1.84)* 
          
3 0.1648 0.1024 0.1685 -0.0940 -0.0578 -0.0988 -0.0458 -0.0080 -0.0558 
 (1.54) (0.91) (1.56) (2.87)*** (1.67)* (3.10)*** (1.22) (0.16) (1.62) 
Number of observations 1726 1720 1713 1726 1720 1713 1726 1720 1713 
Number of treated banks 276 273 273 276 273 273 276 273 273 
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Panel B: One year before the treatment  
 
 Outcome variable: Z-score Standard deviation of return Earnings volatility 
Number of matching banks High DI High SP High ED High DI High SP High ED High DI High SP High ED 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
1 -0.1985 -0.2335 -0.1978 0.0008 0.0069 -0.0029 0.0055 0.0230 -0.0035 
 (2.07)** (2.21)** (2.07)** (0.02) (0.18) (0.09) (0.15) (0.56) (0.09) 
          
2 -0.2585 -0.2510 -0.2538 0.0065 0.0095 0.0153 0.0115 0.0257 0.0213 
 (2.94)*** (2.69)*** (2.90)*** (0.22) (0.26) (0.53) (0.34) (0.67) (0.66) 
          
3 -0.2663 -0.2518 -0.2567 0.0103 0.0122 0.0061 0.0213 0.0336 0.0157 
 (3.10)*** (2.84)*** (3.00)*** (0.38) (0.38) (0.22) (0.69) (0.97) (0.49) 
Number of observations 1514 1501 1510 1514 1501 1510 1514 1501 1510 
Number of treated banks 253 251 254 253 251 254 253 251 254 
 
  
86 
 
APPENDIX B 
SUPPLEMENTAL TABLES 
 
Table A: Distribution of Subordinated Debt Issuers 
Panel A: Distribution of subordinated debt issuers over time 
    SND/TL, % 
Year No. obs. Mean Median 
2002 143 2.06 1.78 
2003 179 2.11 1.78 
2004 214 2.15 1.85 
2005 485 2.29 2.09 
2006 604 2.34 2.16 
2007 521 2.29 2.15 
 
 
Panel B: Distribution of subordinated debt issuers across countries over 2002-2007 
      SND/TL, % 
Country No. banks No. obs. Mean Median 
ARGENTINA 6 20 2.78 2.98 
AUSTRALIA 7 7 2.14 2.11 
AUSTRIA 6 20 2.96 3.41 
BAHRAIN 3 8 2.49 1.99 
BELGIUM 4 8 1.58 1.68 
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 1 4 1.61 1.46 
BRAZIL 11 42 3.40 3.50 
BULGARIA 1 3 2.05 1.86 
CANADA 9 54 1.58 1.48 
CHINA-PEOPLE'S REP. 11 34 1.01 1.05 
CROATIA 3 9 0.89 1.09 
CYPRUS 3 15 2.61 2.70 
CZECH REPUBLIC 2 6 0.91 0.94 
DENMARK 35 116 3.69 3.27 
EL SALVADOR 4 11 1.08 1.14 
ESTONIA 3 14 2.21 2.51 
FINLAND 1 2 3.13 3.13 
FRANCE 6 9 1.26 1.13 
GERMANY 14 56 1.50 1.57 
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GREECE 9 17 2.10 2.17 
HONG KONG 9 16 3.31 3.39 
HUNGARY 1 5 1.30 0.62 
ICELAND 3 3 3.03 3.20 
INDIA 1 2 2.31 2.31 
INDONESIA 14 53 2.06 1.69 
IRELAND 5 8 1.95 2.19 
ISRAEL 6 34 3.83 3.64 
ITALY 11 16 2.10 2.04 
JAPAN 13 41 0.28 0.24 
JORDAN 1 2 1.48 1.48 
KAZAKHSTAN 10 40 3.98 3.89 
KOREA REP. OF 11 50 2.36 2.41 
KUWAIT 2 6 1.42 1.40 
LATVIA 3 6 2.00 1.94 
LITHUANIA 4 19 1.82 2.02 
LUXEMBOURG 3 3 3.11 2.97 
MACEDONIA (FYROM) 2 2 2.22 2.22 
MALAYSIA 11 35 1.85 1.83 
MALTA 3 13 1.49 1.37 
MEXICO 4 14 1.88 1.40 
NETHERLANDS 5 11 2.48 1.36 
NORWAY 2 2 2.31 2.31 
OMAN 3 16 2.12 1.67 
PAKISTAN 2 2 1.70 1.70 
PANAMA 1 2 0.95 0.95 
PERU 2 6 1.48 1.38 
PHILIPPINES 6 12 2.75 2.82 
POLAND 3 8 2.63 2.52 
PORTUGAL 7 10 2.89 2.81 
QATAR 1 1 1.30 1.30 
ROMANIA 2 4 2.32 2.31 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION 21 57 2.53 2.60 
SAUDI ARABIA 2 4 2.02 1.94 
SINGAPORE 4 7 3.55 3.63 
SLOVAKIA 1 1 1.07 1.07 
SLOVENIA 4 16 1.56 1.45 
SOUTH AFRICA 6 9 1.95 1.87 
SPAIN 8 16 2.14 2.19 
SRI LANKA 6 30 2.84 2.78 
SWEDEN 3 6 2.06 1.99 
SWITZERLAND 3 11 0.96 0.84 
TAIWAN 11 15 2.58 3.02 
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THAILAND 1 1 0.38 0.38 
TUNISIA 1 1 2.04 2.04 
TURKEY 5 14 1.13 1.08 
UKRAINE 8 21 2.21 1.91 
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 4 6 2.25 2.23 
UNITED KINGDOM 8 14 2.66 2.60 
USA 338 1012 2.19 2.09 
VENEZUELA 2 5 0.84 0.87 
ZAMBIA 1 3 1.34 1.30 
Total 727 2146     
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Table B: Distribution of Subordinated Debt First Issuances 
Panel A: Distribution of first issuances over time 
  2003-2007 2003-2007 matching sample 
Year All countries The USA All countries The USA 
2003 28 16 15 9 
2004 38 19 16 11 
2005 318 298 224 217 
2006 31 16 21 12 
2007 19 10 10 7 
Total 434 359 286 256 
 
 
Panel B: Distribution of first issuances across countries over 2003-2007 
Country 2003-2007 2003-2007 matching sample 
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 3 2 
BRAZIL 4 3 
CHINA-PEOPLE'S REP. 5 
COLOMBIA 1 
DENMARK 5 4 
EGYPT 1 
EL SALVADOR 1 
GEORGIA REP. OF 1 
GREECE 1 
HONG KONG 1 1 
INDIA 5 
ISRAEL 1 
JAPAN 3 
KAZAKHSTAN 4 3 
KENYA 1 
KOREA REP. OF 2 
KUWAIT 2 2 
KYRGYZSTAN 1 
MALAYSIA 3 
MAURITIUS 1 
OMAN 1 1 
PAKISTAN 3 
QATAR 1 
ROMANIA 1 1 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION 6 4 
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SAUDI ARABIA 1 1 
SLOVAKIA 1 
SRI LANKA 2 
TAIWAN 4 
TURKEY 1 1 
UKRAINE 3 2 
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 3 3 
USA 359 256 
VENEZUELA 1 1 
ZAMBIA 1 1 
Total 434 286 
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Table C: Robustness Check for Banks with Unconsolidated Financial Statements   
 
Regressions in Panel A include a dummy for banks with unconsolidated accounts. Regressions in Panel B include a dummy for banks with 
unconsolidated accounts and positive SND ratio and an interaction term between this dummy and the SND ratio. Dependent variable is z-score in 
Columns (1)-(3), standard deviation of return in Columns (4)-(6), and earnings volatility in Columns (7)-(9). Regressors are lagged by one year. All 
regressions are estimated using 2SLS, where Columns (1), (4) and (7) report the results for the High subsample on Disclosure-insurance index (High 
DI); Columns (2), (5) and (8) report the results for the High subsample on Supervisory power index (High SP); and Columns (3), (6) and (9) report the 
results for the High subsample on Economic development (High ED). The IVs for SND/RWA are the average SND ratio of other banks in the same 
country, year, and size group, the lagged capital-to-assets ratio, and the average tax rate. In Panel B, the IVs for the interaction term between the SND 
ratio and the unconsolidated dummy are the interaction terms between the unconsolidated dummy and each of the three variables: the average SND ratio 
of other banks in the same country, year and size group, the bank’s lagged capital-to-assets ratio, and the bank’s average tax rate. See Table I for 
variable definition. Also included are the p-value of the regression-based test of endogeneity, the partial R2 of excluded instruments in the first-stage 
estimation of SND/RWA, the p-value of the F-test of excluded instruments in the first-stage estimation of SND/RWA, and the p-value of the Hansen J 
test of overidentification. Also reported at the bottom of Panel B is the p-value of the test of the null hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients on the 
SND ratio and on the interaction term between the SND ratio and the unconsolidated dummy is zero. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. 
z-statistics are reported in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: The Unconsolidated dummy is an indicator variable that takes value 1 for banks with unconsolidated accounts 
        
Dependent variable: Z-score Standard deviation of return Earnings volatility 
 
High DI High SP High ED High DI High SP High ED High DI High SP High ED 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
SND/RWA .2030 .2719 .2814 -1.055 -1.253 -1.148 -.9251 -1.058 -1.027 
 (2.57)** (9.98)*** (3.19)*** (3.97)*** (15.23)*** (4.65)*** (4.38)*** (16.84)*** (5.81)*** 
Loan growth -.0113 -.0105 -.0119 .0152 .0156 .0162 .0146 .0146 .0155 
 (8.16)*** (5.83)*** (11.87)*** (4.42)*** (4.90)*** (6.27)*** (5.14)*** (5.60)*** (7.47)*** 
Size -.0038 -.0121 -.0270 .2437 .3264 .2645 .2016 .2657 .2256 
 (0.25) (1.12) (1.86)* (2.46)** (10.45)*** (2.73)*** (2.41)** (11.14)*** (2.91)*** 
Demand deposits ratio .0023 .0066 .0012 .0012 -.0023 .0002 .0010 -.0020 .0003 
 (0.80) (3.12)*** (0.29) (0.54) (0.66) (0.13) (0.52) (0.74) (0.15) 
Independence dummy .0181 .0826 .0080 .0122 -.1158 -.0092 .0596 -.0377 .0290 
 (0.45) (1.63) (0.17) (0.11) (2.06)** (0.07) (0.54) (0.60) (0.25) 
Loan loss provisions ratio -.0219 -.0217 -.0300 .0160 .0150 .0241 .0110 .0103 .0199 
 (3.18)*** (2.87)*** (3.85)*** (2.74)*** (2.66)*** (4.50)*** (1.80)* (1.81)* (4.06)*** 
Liquidity ratio -.0071 -.0125 -.0076 .0099 .0160 .0118 .0139 .0234 .0153 
 (1.62) (5.48)*** (1.72)* (1.66)* (3.60)*** (2.06)** (1.76)* (5.08)*** (1.97)** 
Unconsolidated dummy -.1145 -.0585 -.0767 -.3283 -.4926 -.4166 -.3173 -.4494 -.3955 
 (1.89)* (2.41)** (1.08) (1.46) (4.77)*** (1.95)* (1.67)* (5.47)*** (2.20)** 
GDP per capita .4605 .6814 .4706 -.6673 -1.615 -1.767 -.6862 -1.601 -1.389 
 (0.54) (1.05) (0.75) (0.42) (1.51) (1.25) (0.50) (1.41) (1.12) 
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Capital regulation index .0933 -.0376 .1277 -.1272 .2401 -.3425 -.1381 .2063 -.2776 
 (1.27) (0.41) (2.15)** (0.80) (1.89)* (3.49)*** (1.22) (1.67)* (3.29)*** 
Supervisory index -.0052 .0745 -.1179 -.0354 .0872 -.0746 -.0701 -.0982 -.0622 
 (0.09) (0.55) (1.63) (0.33) (0.22) (0.55) (0.77) (0.26) (0.54) 
Disclosure-insurance index -.0189 -.2679 -.0397 .1886 .8687 .4413 .2757 .5420 .3509 
 (0.08) (2.85)*** (0.22) (0.53) (3.27)*** (1.20) (1.00) (2.26)** (1.15) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of clusters 40 28 31 40 28 31 40 28 31 
Observations 2048 1762 1966 2048 1762 1966 2048 1761 1965 
Test of endogeneity(p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Partial R2 of instruments 0.0577 0.0569 0.0551 0.0577 0.0569 0.0551 0.0577 0.0569 0.0550 
F-test of instruments (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Hansen J test (p-value) 0.5497 0.5078 0.5327 0.0349 0.1812 0.0554 0.0216 0.1621 0.0694 
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Panel B: The Unconsolidated dummy is an indicator variable that takes value 1 for banks with unconsolidated accounts and positive subordinated 
debt ratio 
        
Dependent variable: Z-score Standard deviation of return Earnings volatility 
 
High DI High SP High ED High DI High SP High ED High DI High SP High ED 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
SND/RWA .2383 .2671 .2851 -.9806 -1.072 -1.030 -.8564 -.8730 -.9158 
 (3.97)*** (6.92)*** (4.51)*** (4.43)*** (18.95)*** (5.13)*** (4.84)*** (13.72)*** (6.04)*** 
SND/RWA * Unconsolidated dummy -.0157 .1720 -.2478 .2165 .0744 .4905 .1881 .1924 .4047 
 (0.13) (0.76) (2.88)*** (1.00) (0.31) (4.69)*** (1.33) (1.12) (3.33)*** 
Loan growth -.0118 -.0107 -.0118 .0134 .0133 .0133 .0129 .0123 .01284 
 (9.68)*** (6.34)*** (13.13)*** (4.83)*** (5.29)*** (5.86)*** (5.73)*** (5.70)*** (6.99)*** 
Size -.0024 -.0028 -.0231 .2689 .3213 .2854 .2255 .2546 .2449 
 (0.16) (0.19) (1.95)* (2.76)*** (10.16)*** (3.19)*** (2.68)*** (7.62)*** (3.29)*** 
Demand deposits ratio .0020 .0062 .0009 -.0005 -.0043 -.0014 -.0005 -.0035 -.001293 
 (0.66) (2.82)*** (0.20) (0.18) (1.40) (0.61) (0.22) (1.52) (0.62) 
Independence dummy .0413 .0992 .0465 .0895 .0410 .0654 .1337 .0894 .1039 
 (1.05) (2.48)** (1.11) (1.95)* (1.26) (2.56)** (3.07)*** (2.91)*** (4.52)*** 
Loan loss provisions ratio -.0221 -.0213 -.0303 .0154 .0146 .0239 .0105 .0102 .01968 
 (3.22)*** (2.67)*** (4.10)*** (2.90)*** (2.73)*** (5.89)*** (1.85)* (1.97)** (5.28)*** 
Liquidity ratio -.0077 -.0127 -.0080 .0096 .0133 .0111 .0135 .0208 .01462 
 (1.77)* (5.52)*** (1.89)* (2.25)** (3.96)*** (3.15)*** (2.12)** (5.62)*** (2.55)** 
Unconsolidated dummy -.0129 -.2857 .4666 .2852 .3468 -.1731 .2128 -.0831 -.05521 
 (0.04) (0.52) (2.11)** (0.56) (0.81) (0.77) (0.61) (0.26) (0.20) 
GDP per capita .4649 .6594 .5428 -.7659 -1.471 -1.584 -.7741 -1.438 -1.209 
 (0.54) (1.00) (0.83) (0.50) (1.54) (1.21) (0.58) (1.42) (1.05) 
Capital regulation index .0927 -.0460 .1064 -.1213 .2075 -.3192 -.1339 .1748 -.2601 
 (1.32) (0.48) (1.89)* (0.80) (1.79)* (3.61)*** (1.26) (1.58) (3.36)*** 
Supervisory index -.0030 .0405 -.1155 -.0283 .0826 -.0687 -.0638 -.1194 -.05469 
 (0.05) (0.26) (1.62) (0.29) (0.24) (0.58) (0.76) (0.38) (0.55) 
Disclosure-insurance index -.0184 -.2923 -.0341 .1649 .7664 .4161 .2562 .4174 .3248 
 (0.08) (2.13)** (0.19) (0.47) (3.48)*** (1.24) (0.95) (2.21)** (1.19) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of clusters 40 28 31 40 28 31 40 28 31 
Observations 2048 1762 1966 2048 1762 1966 2048 1761 1965 
Test of endogeneity(p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Partial R2 of instruments 0.0702 0.0739 0.0694 0.0702 0.0739 0.0694 0.0702 0.0738 0.0693 
F-test of instruments (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Hansen J test (p-value) 0.4515 0.7648 0.7815 0.0589 0.3572 0.2982 0.0488 0.2953 0.2849 
Row1 + Row2 = 0 (p-value) 0.1479 0.0787 0.7147 0.0190 0.0000 0.0020 0.0049 0.0002 0.0000 
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